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ARBITRATION CLAUSES,  
JURY-WAIVER CLAUSES, AND  
OTHER CONTRACTUAL WAIVERS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
STEPHEN J. WARE* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Declaration of Independence refers to the rights to life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness as inalienable.1  Some rights, however, are alienable.  Con-
sent is a common means of alienating, or "waiving,"2 one's rights.  In criminal 
procedure, for example, consent to search is a means of waiving Fourth 
Amendment rights.3  In family law, consent to adoption is a means of waiving 
parental rights.4  And in tort law, consent to bodily touching is a means of 
waiving rights against battery.5 
While consent is a means of waiving rights in many areas of law, these areas 
vary in their standards of consent.  For example, the standards of consent gov-
erning jury-waiver clauses tend to be higher than those governing contracts 
generally.6  This point is the basis for an argument that the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA)7 is unconsitutional.  The FAA requires courts to apply contract-law 
standards of consent to arbitration agreements,8 but certain commentators 
argue that courts are instead constitutionally required to apply the higher 
standards of consent governing jury-waiver clauses.9  This Article responds to 
thesecommentators and argues that the FAA's contract-law standards of 
consent are constitutional. 
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 1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 2. See infra Part II for a discussion of the word "waiver" and other terminology. 
 3. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.10 (3d ed. 2000). 
 4. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 20.4 
(2d ed. 1988). 
 5. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 95 (2000); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 18 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988). 
 6. Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and Demise of the Seventh Amendment 
Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 674 (2001). 
 7. 9 U.S.C. §§ 16-16 (2000). 
 8. See infra Part III.A. 
 9. See infra Part III.B. 
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Part II of the Article briefly surveys the jury-trial right and the many ways in 
which it can be waived, including by consent to a contract containing either an 
arbitration clause or a jury-waiver clause.  Part III contrasts the contract-law 
standards of consent in arbitration law with the knowing-consent standards 
governing jury-waiver clauses.  Part IV focuses on the FAA and argues that it 
cannot plausibly be interpreted to require knowing consent or any other stan-
dards of consent except those used by contract law. 
Part V responds to and rejects commentators' arguments that courts are 
constitutionally required to apply a knowing-consent standard to arbitration 
agreements.  Part V first explains that knowing-consent standards for waivers of 
constitutional rights are common in the criminal context but less prevalent in 
the civil context.  It then discusses several examples of courts' using contract-
law standards of consent for civil waivers of constitutional rights and suggests 
that the case law on jury-waiver clauses is an aberration because it generally 
uses a knowing-consent standard.  Part VI suggests that the doctrinal founda-
tions for this aberration are weak because the courts only recently adopted a 
knowing-consent standard for jury-waiver clauses and the Supreme Court has 
never done so.  In sum, Part VI raises doubts about whether a knowing-consent 
standard is even constitutionally required for jury-waiver clauses, let alone for 
all civil waivers of constitutional rights. 
Part VII concludes that, if the Supreme Court were to harmonize the law on 
civil waivers of constitutional rights by requiring that the same standard of con-
sent be used regardless of the type of waiver or the right waived, it would likely 
end the knowing-consent requirement in the law governing jury-waiver clauses 
rather than add this requirement to arbitration and other areas of law—and 
rightly so.10 
 
 10. Because it is a topic rich enough for a separate article, arguments against harmonizing the law 
on civil waivers of constitutional rights, including the argument that the purposes of the Constitution 
are best served by continuing to require higher standards of consent for jury-waiver clauses than for 
arbitration clauses, are not discussed here.  Several courts have taken this approach by treating the 
jury-trial right as one that attaches only after a party has overcome other hurdles.  See, e.g., Am. Heri-
tage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702, 711 (5th Cir. 2002) ("The Seventh Amendment does not confer 
the right to a trial, but only the right to have a jury hear the case once it is determined that the litigation 
should proceed before a court.  If the claims are properly before an arbitral forum pursuant to an arbi-
tration agreement, the jury trial right vanishes.") (quoting Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1471 (N.D. Ill. 1997)); Sydnor v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 252 F.3d 
302, 307 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he right to a jury trial attaches in the context of judicial proceedings after 
it is determined that litigation should proceed before a court."); Geldermann, Inc. v. CFTC, 836 F.2d 
310, 323-24 (7th Cir. 1987) ("In a non-Article III forum the Seventh Amendment simply does not apply.  
Because we hold that Geldermann is not entitled to an Article III forum, the Seventh Amendment is 
not implicated.") (citations omitted). 
 Professor Jean Sternlight rejects this approach, calling it "[c]ircular and [i]llegitimate," as well as 
"absurd[]."  See Sternlight, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 719, 725.  But there is an 
argument—based on viewing the Seventh Amendment jury-trial right not just as the individual right of 
the litigant, but also as a structural constraint on the power of federal judges—that the Constitution 
supports a higher standard of consent for jury-waiver clauses than for arbitration clauses.  See Deborah 
J. Matties, Note, A Case for Judicial Self-restraint in Interpreting Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in 
Federal Court, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 431, 464 (1997) ("[A]rbitration decreases judges' power, which 
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II 
THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL AND CONSENT TO WAIVE IT 
The Seventh Amendment provides that "[i]n suits at common law, where 
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury 
shall be preserved."11  The Amendment applies only in federal court,12 but 
nearly all state constitutions contain a provision that similarly protects the right 
to trial by jury.13  Courts generally interpret federal and state constitutional pro-
visions to confer a jury-trial right only in cases arising at law, as opposed to 
cases in equity.14  In addition to constitutional jury-right provisions, some fed-
eral and state statutes also grant jury-trial rights.15  But there are generally no 
jury-trial rights in adjudications outside of courts, such as those before adminis-
trative agencies or arbitrators. 
The jury-trial right, like many other rights, is alienable.16  One way to alien-
ate the jury-trial right is to consent to a contract containing an arbitration 
clause—that is, a clause purporting to waive the right to have disputes resolved 
in litigation and to create the right to have them resolved by arbitration.  An 
enforceable arbitration clause covering a dispute means that arbitration 
replaces litigation with respect to that dispute.  "Disputing parties who have 
previously agreed to arbitrate can contract into some other process of dispute 
resolution, but if they do not do so then each party has the right to have the dis-
pute resolved in arbitration."17 
 
is not contrary to the purposes of the Seventh Amendment, whereas contractual jury waivers increase 
judges' power, which is contrary to the purposes of the Seventh Amendment."). 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 12. The Seventh Amendment is not among those the Supreme Court has interpreted as incorpo-
rated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 
n.6 (1974) ("The Court has not held that the right to jury trial in civil cases is an element of due process 
applicable to state courts through the Fourteenth Amendment."); Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. 
Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916) (stating that the Amendment applies only to proceedings brought in 
federal court). 
 13. Martin H. Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitu-
tional Implications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759, 797 (1977). 
 14. STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 2.55(a) (2001) (citing Feltner v. 
Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 347-48 (1998); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. New 
York, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1990)). 
 15. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 
§ 4, 92 Stat. 189, 190 (1978); see also Ellen E. Sward, Legislative Courts, Article III, and the Seventh 
Amendment, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1037, 1040 n.11 (1999). 
 16. One can alienate one's rights in two ways: in exchange for consideration or in the absence of 
consideration.  To put it another way, one can trade away one's rights, or one can give away one's 
rights.  In some legal contexts, such as contract law, the term "waiver" is often used to refer only to 
giving away one's rights.  Standard accounts of contract law, for example, carefully distinguish the 
"waiver" of contractual rights, which does not require consideration, from the "modification" of con-
tractual rights, which does.  See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.5 (3d ed. 1999).  In dis-
cussions of the jury-trial right, however, "waiver" seems to be used more broadly to refer both to giving 
away and to trading away one's right to a jury trial.  This Article will conform to that custom, even 
though I probably would have chosen the term "exchange" if I were writing on a clean slate.  The jury-
trial "waivers" discussed in this Article are "exchanges"—that is, cases in which the jury-trial right is 
being exchanged, along with other rights, for consideration as part of a contract. 
 17. WARE, supra note 14, § 1.7(b). 
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Another way to waive the jury-trial right is to consent to a contract con-
taining a jury-waiver clause.  Unlike arbitration clauses, jury-waiver clauses nei-
ther waive the right to have disputes resolved in litigation nor create the right to 
have disputes resolved by arbitration.  Jury-waiver clauses only purport to 
waive the right to have disputes resolved by a jury, replacing it with the bench 
trial as the default process of dispute resolution. 
III 
CONTRACT-LAW STANDARDS VERSUS KNOWING CONSENT 
While the law governing arbitration clauses and that governing jury-waiver 
clauses both make consent a means of waiving the jury-trial right, they differ in 
their standards of consent.  Arbitration-law standards of consent tend to be 
lower than the standards of consent used in the case law governing jury-waiver 
clauses.  In other words, courts are quicker to enforce arbitration clauses than 
jury-waiver clauses. 
A. Arbitration/Contract-Law Standards of Consent 
Arbitration-law standards of consent are contract-law standards of consent. 
This is so because section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides that a 
"written provision . . . to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising 
out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforce-
able, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract."18  The FAA applies to nearly all arbitration agreements,19 and, 
like all federal law, it preempts inconsistent state law.20  The FAA does not, 
however, preempt all state law pertaining to arbitration agreements.  In fact, it 
expressly adopts some state contract law by compelling courts to enforce arbi-
tration agreements "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract."21  Thus, as the Supreme Court explained in Doc-
tor's Associates v. Casarotto,22 
generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress or unconscionability, may 
be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2. 
Courts may not, however, invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws appli-
cable only to arbitration provisions.  By enacting § 2, we have several times said, Con-
gress precluded States from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status, 
requiring instead that such provisions be placed "upon the same footing as other 
contracts."23 
 
 18. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
 19. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-77 (1995); Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984). 
 20. See generally U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution . . . shall be the Supreme Law of the 
Land."). 
 21. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 22. 517 U.S. 681 (1996). 
 23. Id. at 686-87 (citations omitted); see also First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 
(1995) ("When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter . . . courts generally . . . 
should apply ordinary state law principles that govern the formation of contracts."). 
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This legal doctrine is at the center of the current controversy over arbitration 
law.  The FAA makes enforcement of arbitration agreements turn on contract-
law standards of consent, but many critics of the FAA argue that enforcement 
of arbitration agreements should turn on other, more exacting, standards.24 
The FAA's contractual approach finds consent to arbitrate if the contract-
law doctrine of mutual assent is satisfied.25  Importantly, contract law generally 
treats consent as an objective, rather than a subjective, phenomenon.26  In par-
ticular, formation of a contract requires, not mutual assent, but mutual mani-
festations of assent.  "The requirement to form a contract is not that parties 
actually assent to its terms. . . . [but] that they take actions—such as signing their 
names on a document or saying certain words—that would lead a reasonable 
person to believe that they have assented to the terms of the contract."27 
The objectivity in contract law's treatment of consent has enormous implica-
tions for form contracts, the documents millions of people routinely sign with-
out reading, let alone understanding.  Under contract law's objective standards 
of consent, signing (or otherwise manifesting assent to) such a document is, with 
few exceptions, consent to the terms on the document.28  The signature's "blan-
ket assent" is good enough.  Neither reading nor understanding the terms is 
necessary to make those terms enforceable.29 
As with contracts generally, courts find consent to arbitration in the vast 
majority of form contracts containing arbitration clauses.  The nondrafting 
party (a consumer, for example) consents to arbitration by signing the form or 
by manifesting assent in another way, such as by performance of the contract.  
That the consumer did not read or understand the arbitration clause does not 
prevent the consumer from consenting to it.  Nor does the consumer's igno-
rance that an arbitration clause is included on the form.  These are statements 
of ordinary, plain-vanilla contract law.  They are not statements of law peculiar 
to arbitration clauses.  They are the way contract law treats form contract terms 
generally.  The norm in contract law is consent to the unknown. 
But, as in contract law generally, there are exceptions.  Despite a signature 
or other "blanket" assent to a form, courts may find a lack of consent to some 
 
 24. See infra Part III.B.  Of course, more exacting standards of consent would be consistent with 
the FAA if contract law were to adopt them.  A particular state, for example, could make the lack of  
knowing consent a ground for the revocation of any contract, which would make it a valid ground for 
the revocation of arbitration agreements governed by that state's law. 
 25. The requirement of mutual assent "is implicit in the principle that contractual liability is con-
sensual."  FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, § 3.1. 
 26. See id. §§ 3.6, 3.9. 
 27. Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 
113 (1996) (citing FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, § 3.6) (emphasis added). 
 28. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 & cmt. b (1981). 
 29. Of course, non-contract law, such as that enacted through legislation or administrative agency 
regulation, can override contract-law standards of consent respecting particular types of form contracts.  
See id., cmt. c.  But no such overriding limitations govern consent to arbitration, even in the consumer 
context, and the legislation governing arbitration, the FAA, uses contract-law standards of consent. 
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terms—including arbitration clauses—holding them "unconscionable."30  This 
lack of consent in the process of contract formation falls under the under the 
rubric of "procedural" unconscionability.  It encompasses "not only the 
employment of sharp practices and the use of fine print and convoluted lan-
guage, but a lack of understanding and an inequality of bargaining power."31 
Most statements of the law of unconscionability now hold that both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability [which addresses terms that are unreasonably favorable 
to one side] are required before courts will grant relief from a challenged term. Judi-
cial decisions have not consistently followed this principle, however, and some courts 
have suggested a vaguely mathematical metaphor in which a large amount of one type 
of unconscionability can make up for only a small amount of the other. 32 
Dozens of reported decisions have held arbitration clauses unconscionable.33  
All or nearly all of them involve form contracts and what is often referred to as 
"unequal bargaining power."34  In short, under the contractual approach of the 
FAA, courts find consent to arbitration with respect to the vast majority of 
form contracts containing arbitration clauses, but in a significant minority of 
them, consent is vitiated as procedurally unconscionable. 
B. A Noncontractural Standard: Knowing Consent 
The noncontractual approach advocated by the FAA's critics would find a 
lack of consent far more often than the FAA's contractual approach.  That the 
critics' desired standards of consent are more exacting than those of the FAA is 
apparent from the critics' statements about case law under the FAA.  One of 
these critics, Katherine Van Wezel Stone, charges that "in many recent cases, 
courts have applied attenuated notions of consent, compelling arbitration when 
consent is thin, if not outright fictitious."35  Another critic, Jeffrey Stempel, 
 
 30. Other courts have relied on the duty of good faith, see Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 
933, 935, 940 (4th Cir. 1999), or the reasonable expectations doctrine, see Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. 
of Phoenix, 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992). 
 31. FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, § 4.28. 
 32. Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doc-
trines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1993). 
 33. Many of these cases are cited in WARE, supra note 14, § 2.25, and Stephen J. Ware, Paying the 
Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 94 
n.36, 96 n.40, 97 n.49, 98 n.61. 
 34. While this phrase "has never been successfully defined," Craswell, supra note 32, at 50 n.99, it 
seems to be a euphemism for disparities in wealth and experience in business; parties with substantial 
wealth and experience in business are described as having more "bargaining power" than parties with 
little.  See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
1173, 1249 (1983) (equating "gross inequality of bargaining power" with "a wide disparity of economic 
resources"); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference 
for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 637 (1996) (contrasting "[l]arge companies such as 
banks, hospitals, brokerage houses[,] and even pest exterminators" with "customers, employees, fran-
chisees[,] and other little guys"). 
 35. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 962 (1999). 
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attacks the "unrealistic, formal and narrow view of contract consent and mean-
ing demonstrated in recent [arbitration] cases."36 
Possible alternatives to the FAA's contract-law standards of consent are 
many, but the FAA's critics appear to be coalescing around standards that 
would require knowing consent.  The Ninth Circuit, which seems to be the cir-
cuit least inclined to find an enforceable arbitration agreement,37 has used a 
knowing-consent standard in refusing to enforce certain arbitration clauses.38  
Other judges, such as Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore, have also used a 
knowing-consent standard.39 
A knowing-consent standard is perhaps most thoughtfully advocated by 
Jean Sternlight, a vigorous critic of the FAA's contractual approach.40  Professor 
 
 36. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and 
the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1384 n.8 (1996); see also Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. 
Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, passim (describing consumer arbitration 
agreements not as products of mutual consent, but as "predation" by those with "economic power" on 
those lacking such power); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee 
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 58 ("[I]f an 
arbitration clause has been inserted in a contract of adhesion on a 'take-it-or-leave-it' basis, it is difficult 
to characterize it as the product of 'consent,' 'agreement' or 'bargaining.'"). 
 37. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the 
FAA did not cover an agreement to arbitrate employment claims), rev'd, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), on 
remand, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that the agreement was both procedurally and sub-
stantively unconscionable); Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(refusing to enforce an agreement to arbitrate Title VII claims), overruled by EEOC v. Luce, Forward, 
Hamilton & Scripps, LLP, 345 F.3d 742, 749 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 38. See Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1997) (requiring "at 
least a knowing agreement to arbitrate employment disputes") (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 
F.3d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994)); Prudential, 42 F.3d at 1305 ("[W]e conclude that a Title VII plaintiff 
may only be forced to forego her statutory remedies and arbitrate her claims if she has knowingly 
agreed to submit such disputes to arbitration."). 
 39. See Ex parte Allen, 798 So. 2d 668, 676-77 (Ala. 2001) (Moore, C.J., concurring). 
 40. In Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbi-
tration, Professor Sternlight argues that "Congress should amend the FAA to effectively reverse the 
Court's ruling [in Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687  (1996)], protect weaker parties, 
and ensure the constitutionality of the FAA," and that "states should be allowed to enact legislation 
designed to ensure that agreements are entered knowingly and voluntarily."  Sternlight, supra note 34, 
at 707.  In Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 72 
TUL. L. REV. 1, 59 (1997) [herinafter Sternlight, Rethinking], she discusses the standards of consent 
required by constitutional provisions, including the Seventh Amendment, and argues for a standard 
"sufficient to protect ignorant employees and consumers from unwittingly waiving their rights to a jury 
trial, an Article III judge, and due process."  And in Mandatory Binding Arbitration and Demise of the 
Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, she argues directly that the Seventh Amendment requires 
courts to apply knowing-consent standards to arbitration agreements.  See Sternlight, supra note Error! 
Bookmark not defined., passim. 
With varying degrees of specificity, several other scholars have indicated that they share the view 
that the Seventh Amendment requires a knowing-consent standard for arbitration agreements.  See 
Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 102-13 (1992); Richard C. 
Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil 
Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1019-34 (2000); Richard E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities 
Arbitration: Whither Consent?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1335, 1352 n.63 (1996); Stempel, supra note 36, at 
1389-93. 
WARE - KELLY 2 - 2.DOC 10/14/2004  10:26 AM 
Winter/Spring 2004] WAIVERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 174 
Sternlight explains how knowing-consent standards for jury-waiver clauses 
differ from the contract-law standards of consent used in arbitration cases:41 
While courts have not adopted an identical phrasing of the factors to be considered in 
examining contractual jury trial waivers, there is substantial agreement regarding what 
kinds of information is relevant.  Courts typically consider any actual negotiations 
over the clause, whether the clause was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the 
conspicuousness of the waiver, the degree of bargaining disparity between the parties, 
and the experience and sophistication of the party opposing the waiver.  Courts have 
not been explicit as to how these factors relate to one another, but seem to consider 
them all together.  Thus, it is not necessary to make a strong showing on all of the 
factors to uphold a jury waiver clause.  Equally, it is not necessary to make a strong 
showing on all of the factors to defeat a jury waiver clause.42 
Thus, knowing-consent standards resemble, but go farther than, the uncon-
scionability doctrine.  Finding a lack of "knowing" consent seems something 
like a finding procedural unconscionability, which Farnsworth characterizes as 
"a lack of understanding and an inequality of bargaining power,"43 so a know-
ing-consent standard may be little different from the unconscionability doctrine 
without the factor of substantive unconscionability.  In any event, both know-
ing-consent standards and the unconscionability doctrine are sufficiently inde-
terminate that one must look at particular cases, rather than general statements 
of law, to appreciate the difference between knowing-consent standards and 
contract-law standards of consent, including those embodied in the unconscion-
ability doctrine, and to appreciate how a knowing-consent standard would 
affect arbitration law and transactions using arbitration clauses.44 
Most significantly, a knowing-consent standard would generally depart from 
contract law's norm of consent to the unknown—that is, its usual practice of 
finding consent to form-contract terms about which one party is ignorant.  If, 
for example, a consumer did not know there was an arbitration clause in a form 
contract, then a knowing-consent standard would likely prevent enforcement of 
the clause.45  Such a standard might lead parties seeking to ensure the enforce-
ability of their arbitration clauses to change how they draft documents and 
structure transactions.  For starters, those drafting forms might put arbitration 
clauses in "large typeface, bold, or capital lettering [and place them] in a key 
location, such as near the signature line of the agreement."46 
Going further, drafters who currently make the arbitration clause one para-
graph of a lengthy document might restructure their transactions to have two 
separate documents, one containing just the arbitration clause, and the other 
 
 41. Sternlight, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 680-710. 
 42. Id. at 680-81. 
 43. FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, § 4.8. 
 44. The following paragraphs rely heavily on Professor Sternlight's research. 
 45. See Heller Fin., Inc. v. Finch-Bayless Equip. Co., No. 90 C 1672, 1990 WL 77500, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 
May 31, 1990) ("Where the [jury] waiver provision is set out in an unnegotiated form contract that is 
not susceptible to negotiation, it is presumed that there was not a knowing waiver of the right to a jury 
trial."); see also Sternlight, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 681-83. 
 46. See Sternlight, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 684-85. 
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containing all the other contractual language.47  Or, if the arbitration clause is to 
remain part of a lengthy document, the drafter might require the consumer to 
separately initial the arbitration clause, in addition to signing the document as a 
whole.  Drafters who currently rely on the consumer's performance of the con-
tract as a manifestation of assent, such as banks and credit card issuers whose 
arbitration clauses appear on "stuffers" mailed with a monthly statement, might 
restructure their transactions to obtain the consumer's signature as a manifesta-
tion of assent to arbitration.48 
Going further still, it is possible that a knowing-consent standard would 
require proof not only that the consumer knew there was an arbitration clause 
in the contract, but that the consumer read and understood the clause.49  This 
standard might be said to require "knowing and intelligent" consent.50  Such a 
standard might lead parties seeking to ensure the enforceability of their arbitra-
tion clauses to further change how they draft documents and structure transac-
tions.  Contracts containing arbitration clauses might be accompanied by writ-
ten disclosures about arbitration.51  But if we cannot be confident that 
consumers will read arbitration agreements before signing them, how can we be 
confident that they will read disclosures about arbitration before proceeding 
with the transaction?  This problem might lead a "knowing and intelligent" 
standard of consent to require drafting parties to provide oral explanations of 
arbitration.52  Just as police officers are trained to give oral Miranda warnings 
about the right to remain silent and the right to a lawyer, parties drafting and 
using arbitration agreements would train their frontline personnel to give oral 
explanations of the jury-trial right and other rights waived through an arbitra-
tion agreement.53  These explanations might be videotaped so that the tape 
could be introduced into evidence in the event of litigation over their content or 
quality.54 
But how can we be confident that consumers will understand the oral expla-
nations they receive?  This problem might lead a "knowing and intelligent" 
 
 47. See Motoko Rich & John D. McKinnon, Do Arbitration Pacts Steer Car Buyers Wrong Way?, 
WALL ST. J. (Southeast Journal), Nov. 26, 1997, at S1 (reporting that the president of the Automobile 
Dealers Association of Alabama "says his group has urged dealers to print the arbitration clauses on 
separate pieces of paper and introduce them early in the contract signing process"). 
 48. See Sternlight, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 690. 
 49. See id. at 682 ("Courts also examine the discussions, if any, surrounding inclusion of the [jury-
waiver] clause.  They are more likely to uphold clauses that were accurately explained."). 
 50. See id. at 679 (noting that "knowing and intelligent" is one of many phrases courts use without 
making distinctions among them). 
 51. See id. at 682. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See generally Clark Freshman, Tweaking the Market for Autonomy: A Problem-Solving Per-
spective on Informed Consent in Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 909 (2002) (discussing the practical 
problems in determining what should be disclosed about arbitration). 
 54. See, e.g., Stout v. J.D. Byrider,  228 F.3d 709, 713 (6th Cir. 2000 ) ("Closings at the Sandusky 
dealership are videotaped by a wall mounted camera for training and quality assurance purposes."); 
Earle Eldridge, More Car Dealers Now Videotape Sales, USA TODAY, July 3, 2001, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/autos/2001-07-03-on-tape.htm. 
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standard of consent to require consumers to take an exam on arbitration.  This 
exam could be an oral exam given by the judge in open court: judges would 
question consumers about their decision to consent to arbitration, much the 
way judges now question criminal defendants about their decisions to plead 
guilty or to try their cases without a lawyer.55  Alternatively, instead of trying to 
enable the consumer to make a "knowing and intelligent" choice, the law could 
permit the consumer's lawyer to make such a choice.  A "knowing and intelli-
gent" consent standard might be satisfied if the consumer hires a lawyer who 
signs an affidavit opining that it is in the consumer's best interests to consent to 
the arbitration agreement.56  This would be analogous to the "undue hardship" 
affidavits signed by lawyers who represent individual debtors seeking to reaf-
firm debts that would otherwise be discharged in bankruptcy.57 
In sum, a knowing-consent standard could be far more exacting than the 
FAA's contractual standards of consent, and this would result in courts finding 
consent in far fewer arbitration agreements.  This might well be the case in vir-
tually all agreements involving consumers, employees, and other ordinary indi-
viduals who did not first have a lawyer review the agreement.  And even the 
mildest step toward knowing consent—requiring arbitration clauses to be 
prominently displayed—would be more exacting than the FAA's contract-law 
standards of consent.58 
IV 
THE FAA'S CONTRACT-LAW STANDARDS OF CONSENT: 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Because FAA section 2 adopts contract law's standards of consent, a know-
ing-consent standard would be inconsistent with the FAA.  This view is based 
on the language of the FAA and Supreme Court jurisprudence, including, most 
recently, Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto,59 in which eight justices joined the 
Court's opinion.60  Even before Casarotto, the leading arbitration treatise rec-
 
 55. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., §11.3(b). 
 56. See Sternlight, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 687-89 ("When a relatively weak 
party is represented by an attorney, some courts have found that the representation is sufficient to allay 
concerns about the party's lack of bargaining power."). 
 57. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(3) (2000). 
 58. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 618, 687 (1996) (holding that the FAA preempts a 
Montana statute requiring that contracts containing arbitration clauses provide notice of the arbitration 
clause in "underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract"). 
 59. 517 U.S. 681, 687  (1996); see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (quoting Casarotto). 
 60. Casarotto involved a Montana statute requiring that, "[n]otice that a contract is subject to arbi-
tration . . . be typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract; and unless such notice 
is displayed thereon, the contract may not be subject to arbitration."  MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) 
(1995) (repealed 1997).  The Supreme Court held that the statute was preempted by the FAA because 
it "condition[ed] the enforceability of arbitration agreements on compliance with a special notice 
requirement not applicable to contracts generally."  517 U.S. at 687.  As the Supreme Court stated, the 
FAA "precluded States from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status, requiring instead 
that such provisions be placed 'upon the same footing as other contracts.'"  Id. (quoting Scherk v. 
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).  Justice Thomas's lone dissent related not to the stan-
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ognized that laws "requiring greater information or choice in the making of 
agreements to arbitrate than in other contracts" are inconsistent the FAA.61  
Yet, Professor Sternlight rejects the view that application of knowing-consent 
standards would "clearly be inconsistent with the FAA's statutory language 
requiring that courts enforce predispute arbitration agreements 'save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.'"62 
While some courts have construed that language to support only common law contrac-
tual defenses such as unconscionability and fraud, there is no reason why the princi-
ples of contract interpretation deriving from the Seventh Amendment would not be 
considered to be grounds "at law or in equity."  Any contract calling for waiver of a 
constitutional right, including a jury trial right, must be examined to ensure that it is 
voluntary, knowing and intelligent.63 
The flaw in this argument is that the truth of its last sentence requires the words 
"calling for waiver of a constitutional right, including a jury trial right."  Had 
the sentence omitted these words, and read, "Any contract must be examined 
to ensure that it is voluntary, knowing and intelligent," it would have been 
false.64  The FAA's language refers to grounds for the revocation of "any con-
tract," not "any contract calling for waiver of a constitutional right, including a 
jury trial right."  As Casarotto points out, grounds "such as fraud, duress or 
unconscionability" are grounds for the revocation of any contract.65  The lack of 
 
dard of consent required by section 2, but to whether the FAA applies in state as well as federal court.  
See 517 U.S. at 690 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
For other Supreme Court cases, see, for example, First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 
944 (1995) ("When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter . . . courts gener-
ally . . . should apply ordinary state law principles that govern the formation of contracts."); Perry v. 
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) ("[S]tate law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable 
if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts 
generally.  A state law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbi-
trate is at issue does not comport with [the text of Section 2]."). 
The Supreme Court continues to reiterate that "the FAA's purpose [is] 'to reverse the longstanding 
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . . and to place arbitration agreements upon the same foot-
ing as other contracts.'"  Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000) (quoting 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)). 
 61. See 2 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 19.1.1, 19:4-19:5 (1995) (stating 
that under Southland and Perry, "state legislation requiring greater information or choice in the making 
of agreements to arbitrate than in other contracts is preempted" by section 2).  While Macneil et al. 
were writing about state law, which is preempted when inconsistent with the FAA, their point about 
what law is inconsistent with the FAA applies with equal force to federal law, which is not preempted 
because of such inconsistency. 
 62. Sternlight, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 718. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See supra Part III.A. 
 65. Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).  Some courts take the phrase "any con-
tract" more seriously than others.  In KKW Enterprises v. Gloria Jean's Gourmet Coffees Franchising 
Corp., 184 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 1999), the First Circuit took the phrase seriously: 
Here, the Rhode Island statute states that: "A provision in a franchise agreement restricting 
jurisdiction or venue to a forum outside this state . . . is void with respect to a claim otherwise 
enforceable under this act." R.I. Gen. Laws § 19-28.1-14.  Because this proscription limits the 
statute's application to one type of provision, venue clauses, in one type of agreement, 
franchise agreements, the statute does not apply to any contract.  Writ simple, because § 19-
28.1-14 is not a generally applicable contract defense, it is, if applied to arbitration agree-
ments, preempted by § 2 of the FAA. 
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knowing consent is not.  Therefore, it would be very surprising if the Supreme 
Court interpreted FAA section 2 to require knowing consent.  So long as the 
Court continues to interpret section 2 to require contract-law standards of -
consent, the Court can only accept the argument that the Seventh Amendment 
requires "knowing" consent to arbitration clauses if it is willing to hold section 2 
unconstitutional.66 
A holding that section 2 is unconstitutional would be startling.  The FAA 
was enacted more than three-quarters of a century ago.  Since that time, no 
published judicial decision has ever found section 2's contract-law standards of 
consent to be inconsistent with the Seventh Amendment.67  Apparently, no 
commentator even suggested this argument until the FAA's sixth decade of 
existence.68  It is true that, for most of the FAA's life, courts interpreted it to 
apply only in federal, not state, courts.69  But this does not explain why an 
inconsistency between the FAA and the Seventh Amendment, both of which 
have applied in federal court since 1925, would have been missed for so long. 
 
Id. at 50-51.  In contrast is the approach of the Montana Supreme Court in Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys-
tems Corp., 971 P.2d 1240, 1245-46 (Mont. 1998), the opinion for which was written by Justice 
Trieweiler, the author of an impassioned anti-arbitration opinion in Casarotto.  See Casarotto v. Lom-
bardi, 886 P.2d 931, 939 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., concurring), rev'd sub nom. Doctor's Assocs. v. 
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).  In Keystone, the court held that Montana statutes voiding out-of-state 
forum-selection clauses do "not conflict with the FAA" because they do not single out arbitration 
clauses, but apply to both arbitration clauses and forum-selection clauses in contracts generally.  971 
P.2d at 1245.  The statutes do not, in fact, apply to "any contract" because they do not apply to con-
tracts lacking forum-selection clauses.  See Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemp-
tion, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 409-10 (2004); Stephen J. Ware, Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory Arbitration, 
and State Constitutional Jury-Trial Rights, 38 U.S.F. L. Rev. 39, 46-48 (2003). 
 66. Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law, 29 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 195,  216-17 (1998); accord Sternlight, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 718 
("However, if Professor Ware's more narrow interpretation of the FAA prevails, and courts interpret 
Section 2 of the FAA to foreclose use of the standard Seventh Amendment waiver analysis, then he is 
correct that Section 2 is unconstitutional."). 
 67. Professor Sternlight "located just one opinion in which a federal court refused to enforce a con-
tractual arbitration clause on the ground that it violated the Seventh Amendment."  This unpublished 
decision was reversed on appeal.  See Sternlight, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 711 
(citing Sydnor v. AAPCO of Richmond W., No. 3:00 CV 396 (E.D. Va. Sept. 27, 2000) (transcript of 
opinion issued from bench on file with author), rev'd sub nom. Sydnor v. Conseco Fin. Serv. Corp., 252 
F.3d 302, 206-07 (4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting that the parties signed a clause stating that they 
voluntarily and knowingly waived their jury-trial rights, and rejecting the argument that the waiver of 
jury trial calls for a more demanding standard). 
 68. See supra note 40.  A possible earlier example is Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory 
of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV. 478 (1981).  Professor Rubin argued that "the contract standard cannot be 
used to justify those waivers that involve constitutional rights since such rights necessarily take 
precedence over the contract policy of honoring private agreements."  Id. at 545.  However, this argu-
ment was not directed at section 2 of the FAA in particular. 
Though the argument that section 2's contract-law standards of consent are unconstitutional 
because of an inconsistency with the Seventh Amendment is recent, there are much older challenges to 
state arbitration statutes based on jury-trial provisions of state constitutions.  See, e.g., Berkovitz v. 
Arbib & Houlberg, 130 N.E. 288 (N.Y. 1921); see also infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Berkovitz). 
 69. WARE, supra note 14, §§ 2.6-2.8.  For contrasting views on the FAA's application in state court, 
compare IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 92-121 (1992), with Christopher R. Dra-
hozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 (2002). 
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Another argument, suggested by Professor Sternlight, might explain why the 
alleged inconsistency between the FAA and the Seventh Amendment went so 
long unnoticed: 
[T]he Federal Arbitration Act was never intended to permit companies to impose 
arbitration on unknowing consumers and employees, but rather was merely intended 
to allow two sophisticated businesses to enter into predispute arbitration agreements. 
The legislative history of the Act is filled with discussions of how businesses need to be 
able to enter into enforceable arbitration agreements with one another.  In contrast, 
while companies in 1924 did not customarily seek to impose contracts of adhesion on a 
widespread basis, the FAA's legislative history does reflect legislators' concern that 
arbitration not be imposed through nonnegotiable contracts of adhesion in the 
employment or insurance context.  Thus, applying the [knowing-consent standards 
arguably required by the] Seventh Amendment to arbitration would not undercut the 
policy underlying the FAA, but would instead support it.70 
This argument could be read to suggest that an alleged inconsistency between 
the FAA and the Seventh Amendment was missed because the sorts of cases 
raising it (those not involving "two sophisticated businesses") did not arise until 
the 1980s, when arbitration clauses in employment and consumer form con-
tracts became more common.  This suggestion, though, is implausible for the 
following reasons. 
First, the FAA did not make enforceable only arbitration agreements 
between "two sophisticated businesses."  It made enforceable all arbitration 
agreements "involving commerce"71 between all sorts of parties, with the excep-
tion of "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other 
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."72  While the legis-
lative history reflects concern by Senator Walsh of Montana regarding other 
sorts of parties to form contracts,73 these concerns did not find their way into the 
statute. 
For example, consider parties buying an insurance policy (a classic "adhe-
sion" contract) containing an arbitration clause.  The text of the FAA does not 
permit a reading that such insurance arbitration agreements are anything less 
than "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract."74  Congress knew how to carve 
 
 70. Sternlight, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 729-30; see also Sarah Rudolph Cole, 
Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements 
Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 466 (1996) ("[I]t is . . . clear that the 
drafters of the FAA did not intend to include noncommercial contracts with the requisite effects on 
interstate commerce within its scope."); Schwartz, supra note 36, at 75 ("On its face, the statute does 
not expressly limit its coverage to arbitration of any particular subject matter. . . .  However, closer 
inspection of the text and legislative history strongly indicate a congressional intent to create a statute 
within the sphere of the commercial paradigm."). 
 71. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
 72. § 1. 
 73. See A Bill Relating to Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce; and A Bill 
to Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements for Arbitration of Disputes Arising 
Out of Contracts, Maritime Transactions or Commerce Among the States or Territories or With Foreign 
Nations: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9-11 
(1923). 
 74. § 2. 
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out certain employees from the FAA and chose to do so.  With respect to other 
parties, Congress chose not to create exclusions.  In recent years several bills 
have been introduced in Congress to exclude additional parties from the FAA.75  
Enactment of such bills, rather than creative interpretation of the current stat-
ute, is the legitimate way to exclude consumers or other parties from the FAA.76 
Furthermore, it does not take a consumer case to raise an inconsistency 
between the FAA and the Seventh Amendment.  If the Seventh Amendment 
requires knowing consent, then this requirement has long gone unmet in 
countless arbitration agreements between businesses.  Just as consumers rou-
tinely sign form contracts without reading them, so do business people, even 
"sophisticated" ones.  Indeed, the same human being who is a sophisticated 
businessperson in one transaction is a consumer in another.  It is simply not true 
that the line between business and consumer parties is the line between know-
ing and unknowing consent.  So even when business-to-business arbitration 
agreements were the only ones challenged in court, some challengers could 
have avoided those agreements based on a lack of "knowing" consent, had 
courts believed that this is required by the Seventh Amendment.77  That the pre-
1980s case law reveals few, if any, occasions when this knowing-consent argu-
ment was made suggests that lawyers and judges believed that the Seventh 
Amendment requires no more than the FAA's contract-law standards of con-
sent.  Good reasons for this belief are discussed in the following section of this 
Article. 
 
 75. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Anti-arbitration Bills Set Off a Classic Brawl, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 12, 2002, 
at A8. 
 76. It is true, as Jean Sternlight argues, that when the FAA was enacted "the economy looked sub-
stantially different than it looks today.  There were very few transactions between large merchants and 
individual consumers that would have involved interstate commerce and thus fallen under the jurisdic-
tion of the FAA."  Sternlight, supra note 34, at 647.  The great number of transactions now held to 
involve interstate commerce reflects not only an increase in long-distance consumer transactions, but 
also the Supreme Court's expansion of the Commerce Clause to cover transactions previously consid-
ered beyond the reach of federal legislation.  See Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act's 
Interstate Commerce Requirement: What's Left for State Arbitration Law?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385, 
459 (1992) ("Consumer disputes (and other disputes that are the subject of special consideration in 
state arbitration statutes) were unlikely to find their way to federal court in 1926, because they seldom 
involved citizens of more than one state[,] and they usually did not meet the requisite amount in con-
troversy.  Indeed, Congress may have considered such disputes beyond its commerce power in 1925.").  
If applying the FAA to consumer contracts is inconsistent with the intent of the Congress that enacted 
it, that inconsistency is more properly blamed on the Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause 
than on the Court's interpretation of the FAA. 
 77. In "numerous courts," Professor Sternlight points out, businesses have successfully avoided 
enforcement of jury-waiver clauses they had signed.  Sternlight, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 689.  These cases exemplify lack of knowing consent on the part of a business. 
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V 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FAA'S CONTRACT-LAW  
STANDARDS OF CONSENT 
A. The Different Consent Standards for Waiving Constitutional Rights in the 
Criminal and Civil Contexts 
The starting point for some who discuss waivers of constitutional rights is a 
1938 criminal case, Johnson v. Zerbst,78 in which the Supreme Court noted that 
"[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a 
known right or privilege."79  In a later criminal case, Brady v. United States,80 the 
Court stated that "[w]aivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary 
but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the rele-
vant circumstances and likely consequences."81 
Professor Sternlight argues that "[t]he Supreme Court has consistently 
employed the 'knowing, voluntary, intentional standard' for waivers of constitu-
tional rights in the criminal context."82  But this may be misleading.  Even in the 
criminal context, the Court has not consistently applied this standard.  As Pro-
fessor Sternlight has herself acknowledged, "[c]ourts have not required know-
ing waiver . . . in connection with the rights to avoid self incrimination or to be 
present at one's trial, instead allowing defendants to waive these rights merely 
by failing to raise an objection or by taking an action contrary to the right."83  
Another example, pointed out by Edward Rubin over twenty years ago, is the 
waiver of an accused's constitutional due process right not to stand trial before 
a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes.84  Similarly, knowing consent 
is not required for an accused to waive the Sixth Amendment right to be tried in 
the "district wherein the crime shall have been committed."85  As Rubin puts it, 
this is another of the rights to which "courts have applied a much less demand-
ing waiver standard. . . .  While these rights must be waived voluntarily, they 
need not be waived knowingly."86 
 
 78. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
 79. Id. at 464. 
 80. 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
 81. Id. at 748. 
 82. Sternlight, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 678 n.40 ("[W]aivers of constitutional 
rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness 
of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.") (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 
748 (1970)) . 
 83. Id. at 709 n.185 ("A defendant who chooses to testify waives his privilege against compulsory 
self-incrimination with respect to testimony he gives") (quoting Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 
222 (1968)). 
 84. See Rubin, supra note 68, at 492 n.64 (citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976)). 
 85. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 86. Rubin, supra note 68, at 496; see, e.g., United States v. Carreon-Palacio, 267 F.3d 381, 391 (5th 
Cir. 2001) ("The standard for finding a waiver of venue rights is much more relaxed than the rigorous 
standard for finding waivers of the right to trial by jury, the right to confront one's accusers[,] or the 
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The distinction between waivers judged under the strict standard and those judged 
under the more lenient version of the Johnson framework is emphasized by courts' use 
of a subjective method of proof in the first category, and an objective method of proof 
in the second.  When the strict standard is employed, the trial judge often examines 
the defendant as to his state of mind, in order to make sure that he is actually aware of 
his right and willing to relinquish it. . . .  When the lenient waiver standard is used, 
courts employ an objective method of proof.87 
While knowing consent to waive a constitutional right is sometimes not 
required in the criminal context, it is often not required in the civil context.  
According to Rubin, "[t]he Johnson framework, with its emphasis on knowl-
edge and volition, is no longer used in civil law.  Instead, civil law waivers are 
judged according to contract-law principles."88 
B. Property-Deprivation Cases 
In his discussion of civil waivers, Professor Rubin discusses arbitration 
agreements, settlement agreements, and consent judgments, all of which waive 
constitutional rights to due process and, where applicable, jury trial.89  Settle-
ment agreements and consent decrees, however, are formed post-dispute, when 
parties tend to be more aware of the rights they are waiving and when parties 
are often represented by counsel.  Cases more analogous to predispute arbitra-
tion agreements are those in which parties waive constitutional rights in a pre-
dispute contract, especially a form contract.  Professor Sternlight relies on two 
such cases in particular, D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.,90 and Fuentes v. 
Shevin,91 "urg[ing] the Court to apply to arbitration agreements the civil waiver 
standard it has begun to develop" in these cases.92  This urging, however, is 
based on a dated reading of constitutional law.  The Supreme Court and its 
rulings have evolved in significant ways since these 1972 cases. 
Overmyer was an Ohio case involving a cognovit note, an "ancient legal 
device by which the debtor consents in advance to the holder's obtaining a 
judgment without notice or hearing, and possibly even with the appearance, on 
 
privilege against compulsory self incrimination.")(quoting United States v. Winship, 724 F.2d 1116, 
1124 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
 87. Rubin, supra note 68, at 497. 
 88. Id. at 512.  This distinction between the criminal and civil contexts is questioned by Professor 
Sternlight, who says that "[a] strong argument can be made that the Court should apply the criminal 
standard in the civil context as well . . . .  The Court has, after all, never explained why constitutionally 
protected rights should be afforded any less protection in the civil context than in the criminal context."  
Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 40, at 56-57.  Perhaps the explanation is simply that the law in this 
area, as in so many others, is more protective of criminal defendants than of parties to civil actions 
because the consequences of losing tend to be so much more severe.  There is, however, another possi-
ble explanation: In the civil context, parties who waive their constitutional rights nearly always do so as 
part of a contract, a context in which there is "far less danger of overreaching and duress by the party 
seeking to enforce the waiver."  L&R Realty v. Conn. Nat'l Bank, 715 A.2d 748, 755 (Conn. 1998) 
(concluding that "it is appropriate to apply a lower standard in determining the enforceability of preli-
tigation contractual jury trial waivers than for waivers in criminal cases"). 
 89. Rubin, supra note 68, at 512-21. 
 90. 405 U.S. 174 (1972). 
 91. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
 92. Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 40, at 57. 
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the debtor's behalf, of an attorney designated by the holder."93  Unlike other 
states at that time,94 Ohio law permitted cognovits.  The law allowed " a court . . . 
the power to open the judgment upon a proper showing,"95 making it possible for 
a debtor who had signed a cognovit to ultimately avoid judgment on the debt.  
Nevertheless, a cognovit is a waiver of the debtor's constitutional due process 
rights to notice and a hearing prior to the entry of judgment.96 
The Overmyer Court enforced this predispute waiver of constitutional 
rights.  It did so, however, in the context of a negotiated agreement between 
two corporations represented by lawyers; the Overmyer case did not involve a 
form contract presented take-it-or-leave-it to an unrepresented consumer.97  
The Overmyer Court carefully refrained from holding that the knowing-consent 
standard of criminal cases like Brady and Johnson applies in the civil context.98  
The Court pointed out that Overmyer was a corporation and that its agreement 
"was not a contract of adhesion."99  Overmyer's consent to the cognovit was -
knowing—a stark contrast to the unknowing consent routinely given to the 
terms of form contracts. 
Fuentes, on the other hand, involved consumer form contracts.  The con-
sumers had purchased goods under "conditional sales contract[s] calling for 
monthly payments over a period of time."100  Under the law of the Fuentes era, 
the seller retained title to the goods until the consumer paid the debt.  Under 
modern state law, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, these transaction 
are treated as sales, with title passing to the consumer, but with the seller 
retaining a security interest—that is, a consensual lien.101  Under both Article 9 
and the state law in Fuentes, if the consumer-debtor defaults then the seller-
creditor may obtain possession of the goods through a replevin action by which 
a court orders a sheriff or other state actor to take the goods from the con-
sumer.102  The state replevin statutes in Fuentes permitted creditors, upon ex 
parte application to a court clerk and the posting of a bond, to obtain a writ of 
replevin instructing the sheriff to seize the goods.103  Seizure occurred without 
 
 93. 405 U.S. at 176. 
 94. Id. at 177. 
 95. Id. at 184-85. 
 96. Id. at 184. 
 97. According to Richard Shell, 
Overmyer involved a construction subcontract in which the contractor, which had agreed to 
pay the subcontractor by progress payments, fell behind in its payments.  Eventually, after 
several rounds of bargaining, which included attorneys for both sides, the contractor negoti-
ated a new payment schedule at a lower rate of interest in exchange for a contract that con-
tained the cognovit provision. 
G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 433, 477 n.270 (1991). 
 98. 405 U.S. at 185. 
 99. Id. at 186. 
 100. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 70 (1972) (plurality decision). 
 101.See UCC § 1-201(35) (amended 2003). 
 102. 407 U.S. at 78 n.7. 
 103. Id. 
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the debtor receiving notice or the opportunity for a hearing, so the Court held 
that the debtors were deprived of their property without due process of law.104 
In Fuentes, the Court distinguished its holding from that of Overmyer by 
emphasizing the different types of consent given in the two cases.  Unlike 
Overmyer, the parties in Fuentes "were far from equal in bargaining power," 
and the "waiver provision was a printed part of a form sales contract."105  The 
Court held that a "waiver of constitutional rights in any context must, at the 
very least, be clear," and that it need not consider "the involuntariness or unin-
telligence of a waiver when the contractual language relied upon does not, on 
its face, even amount to a waiver."106  There was no clear waiver because the 
contracts 
simply provided that upon a default the seller 'may take back,' 'may retake' or 'may 
repossess' merchandise.  The contracts included nothing about the waiver of a prior 
hearing.  They did not indicate how or through what process—a final judgment, self-
help, prejudgment replevin with a prior hearing, or prejudgment replevin without a 
prior hearing—the seller could take back the goods.107 
For Professor Sternlight, the relevant constitutional law from the Supreme 
Court seems to stop here.  She notes that Fuentes is the last Supreme Court 
decision "directly addressing the waiver of constitutional rights in a civil con-
text."108 
Fuentes, however, was "sharply curtailed"109 only two years later by Mitchell v. 
W.T. Grant Co.110  The facts of Mitchell were almost identical to those of 
Fuentes—a debtor's default on a conditional sales contract.111  As in Fuentes, the 
state statute in Mitchell permitted the creditor, upon ex parte application and 
the posting of a bond, to obtain a writ instructing the sheriff or "constable" to 
take possession of the goods from the debtor.112  Nevertheless, the Mitchell 
Court rejected the debtor's argument that due process entitled him to a hearing 
before seizure of the goods.113  The Court distinguished Fuentes on the ground of 
differing statutes; the statute in Mitchell required the creditor's affidavit to 
allege specific facts and provided for the writ to be issued by a judge with dis-
cretion to deny it.114  In contrast, the statutes in Fuentes allowed the creditor's 
 
 104. Id. at 96. 
 105. Id. at 95. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 95-96. 
 108. Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 40, at 54; see also Reuben, supra note 40, at 1020-21 ("Two 
cases, however, do provide a starting point on the substance of knowledge and voluntariness: D.H. 
Overmyer Co. v. Frick and Fuentes v. Shevin.").  Professor Sternlight does acknowledge that "the 
Court's 1991 decision in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute[, 499 U.S. 585 (1991),] also provides insight 
into how the Court would assess the constitutionality of an arbitration clause imposed by a company on 
weaker parties, such as consumers."  Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 40. 
 109. Shell, supra note 97, at 477-78. 
 110. 416 U.S. 600 (1974). 
 111. Id. at 601-02. 
 112. Id. at 621-23. 
 113. Id. at 607. 
 114. Id. at 616. 
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affidavit to be conclusory and provided for the writ to be issued by a court clerk 
without judicial participation.115 
Supporting Professor Sternlight's treatment of Fuentes as the last Supreme 
Court decision "directly addressing the waiver of constitutional rights in a civil 
context"116 is that Mitchell does not use the term "waiver" to describe the effect 
of the debtor's contract on his due process rights.  Importantly, however, 
Mitchell treats the contract granting a lien as a waiver of the due process right to 
a predeprivation hearing: 
Plainly enough, this is not a case where the property sequestered by the court is 
exclusively the property of the defendant debtor. The question is not whether a 
debtor's property may be seized by his creditors, pendente lite, where they hold no 
present interest in the property sought to be seized.  The reality is that both seller and 
buyer had current, real interests in the property, and the definition of property rights 
is a matter of state law.  Resolution of the due process question must take account not 
only of the interests of the buyer of the property but those of the seller as well.117 
Thus, the Mitchell Court suggested that, had there been no contract granting a 
lien, the due process result would have been different.118  In other words, the 
contract granting the lien waived due process rights the debtor otherwise would 
have retained.  And this was true even though the contract was a form contract 
presented take-it-or-leave-it to an unrepresented consumer.  Mitchell treats a 
consumer's form contract as a waiver of the due process right to a predepriva-
tion hearing.  As Professor Richard G. Shell writes, Mitchell "put to rest any 
notion that contractual waivers of due process rights would always be governed 
by special default rules or limited to sophisticated parties."119  Mitchell plainly 
does not require "knowing" consent; rather, it seems to use contract-law stan-
dards of consent. 
In its most recent case on point, Connecticut v. Doehr,120 the Supreme Court 
continued its treatment of lien-granting contracts as waivers of due process 
rights.  The Doehr plaintiff's claim was for assault and battery.121  Unlike the -
plaintiff-creditor in Mitchell, the plaintiff in Doehr had not obtained a contract 
granting him a lien.  The Doehr Court repeatedly relied on this distinction in 
 
 115. Id. at 615-16. 
 116. Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 40, at 54 (emphasis added). 
 117. 416 U.S. at 604. 
 118. As a matter of policy, such a difference is quite defensible.  As Professor Barry L. Zaretsky 
wrote: 
Di-Chem, Mitchell, Fuentes, and Sniadach may be reconciled by considering the type of pro-
cedure involved in each.  In a replevin proceeding, both the debtor and the creditor have an 
interest in the specific property.  The debtor has a possessory interest and the creditor typi-
cally has a nonpossessory lien.  In balancing these interests, a state may relax the debtor's 
due process rights and permit the creditor first to seize the property and then to litigate.  In a 
garnishment or attachment situation, however, the creditor has no interest in the specific 
property, absent extraordinary circumstances. 
Barry L. Zaretsky, Attachment Without Seizure: A Proposal for a New Creditors' Remedy, 1978 U. ILL. 
L.F. 819, 831 (citations omitted). 
 119. Shell, supra note 97, at 477. 
 120. 501 U.S. 1 (1991). 
 121. Id. at 5. 
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holding that no predeprivation hearing was constitutionally required.122  
Although Doehr, like Mitchell, does not use the word "waiver," it treats a lien-
granting contract as a waiver of the due process right to a predeprivation -
hearing. 
Consistent with this reading of Fuentes, Mitchell, and Doehr, lower courts 
tend to hold that, in the absence of  "exigent circumstances," due process 
requires a predeprivation hearing except when the plaintiff has obtained a pre-
dispute contract and lien.123  In effect, this exception treats contracts granting 
 
 122. Id. at 18.  The Doehr Court held a Connecticut statute unconstitutional because it permitted 
the deprivation of property without due process.  Id. at 8.  The deprivation, a prejudgment attachment 
of real estate, occurred without the defendant's receiving notice or the opportunity for a hearing.  Id. at 
15.  The Court distinguished Mitchell on the ground that, 
in Mitchell, the plaintiff had a vendor's lien to protect, the risk of error was minimal because 
the likelihood of recovery involved uncomplicated matters that lent themselves to documen-
tary proof, and the plaintiff was required to put up a bond.  None of these factors diminishing 
the need for a predeprivation hearing is present in this case. . . . 
Finally, we conclude that the interests in favor of an ex parte attachment, particularly the 
interests of the plaintiff, are too minimal to supply such a consideration here.  The plaintiff 
had no existing interest in Doehr's real estate when he sought the attachment.  His only inter-
est in attaching the property was to ensure the availability of assets to satisfy his judgment if 
he prevailed on the merits of his action. 
. . . . 
. . . Attachments, moreover, were [at common law] generally confined to claims by creditors.  
As we and the Court of Appeals have noted, disputes between debtors and creditors more 
readily lend themselves to accurate ex parte assessments of the merits. Tort actions, like the 
assault and battery claim at issue here, do not. 
Id. at 15-17 (citations omitted). 
 123. The best example of the distinction between plaintiff-creditors who have and have not obtained 
a predispute contract and lien may be Shaumyan v. O'Neill, 987 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1993).  Shaumyan 
involved the same prejudgment attachment statute that Doehr held unconstitutional as applied in the 
context of an assault and battery case.  Yet the Second Circuit held that the statute "is constitutional as 
applied to this debtor-creditor dispute."  Id. at 123.  The court distinguished Doehr on two grounds: 
First, Shaumyan involved a predispute contract.  See id. at 126-27 (distinguishing an intentional tort 
case from the Shaumyan's refusing "to pay an outstanding sum certain due under their contract with 
Sidetex").  Second, Shaumyan involved a lien.  See id. at 127-28 (distinguishing the Doehr plaintiff's 
lack of a preexisting interest in the defendant's property from the Shaumyan plaintiff's mechanic's 
lien).  The Second Circuit held these two grounds were determinative under the second and third of the 
three factors in the Matthews v. Eldridge "balancing test" used by Doehr.  See id. at 125 (citing Mat-
thews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).  Those factors are the "risk of erroneous deprivation" and the 
"interest of the party seeking the prejudgment remedy."  Id. 
For other cases and commentators distinguishing between plaintiff-creditors who had obtained a 
predispute contract and lien and those who had not, see Union Trust Co. v. Heggelund, 594 A.2d 464, 
466 n.3 (Conn. 1991) ("[T]his is not a tort suit, but a suit on a debt, and disputes between debtors and 
creditors more readily lend themselves to accurate ex parte assessments of the merits.") (quotations 
omitted); Shawmut Bank of R.I. v. Costello, 643 A.2d 194, 200 (R.I. 1994) (distinguishing Mitchell in 
part because the plaintiff in Mitchell had a predispute lien on the property to be seized); CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 4 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §1074 n.49 (2002) 
("Although attempting to draw the line between Fuentes and Mitchell may be difficult, it appears that 
the Supreme Court in Mitchell went no further than to approve a preadversary hearing seizure of prop-
erty in which the party obtaining the seizure had a clear and convincing interest, in that case a so-called 
seller's lien."); Linda Beale, Note, Connecticut v. Doehr and Procedural Due Process Values: The 
Siniadach Tetrad Revisited, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1603, 1636 (1994) ("[E]ither a preexisting interest held 
by the attacher or one of the several exigent circumstances mentioned in the cases, plus some appropri-
ate alternative safeguards set forth in Mitchell, would meet procedural due process requirements with-
out need for a prejudgment hearing."); see also Lewis Serv. Ctr., Inc. v. Mack Fin. Corp., 696 F.2d 66 
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liens, such as security agreements governed by Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, as waivers of the due process right to a predeprivation hearing. 
Form security agreements are routinely enforced in consumer124 and other 
contexts.  There is no constitutional requirement of knowing consent to a secu-
rity agreement.  Article 9 uses contract-law standards of consent,125 and courts 
routinely apply these standards to form security agreements even though such 
agreements seem to waive a constitutional due process right.126  In sum, the 
relevant doctrine after Overmyer, Fuentes, Mitchell, Doehr, and lower court 
cases applying them is that lien-granting contracts are waivers of constitutional 
rights and that such waivers are enforceable, even in the absence of knowing 
consent, so long as contract-law standards of consent are satisfied. 
This doctrinal conclusion would not be reached by an analysis stopping with 
Overmyer and Fuentes, such as Professor Sternlight's "urg[ing] the Court to 
 
(8th Cir. 1982) (holding an immediate post-seizure hearing sufficient to satisfy due process); Crown 
Builders, Inc. v. Stowe Eng'g Corp., 8 F. Supp. 2d 483 (D.V.I. 1998) (concluding due process required 
the court to construe the replevin statute to require a predeprivation hearing in a case in which the 
plaintiff lacked a predispute lien); Shawmut Bank v. Valley Farms,  610 A.2d 652, 657-58 (Conn. 1992) 
(holding that due process required the court to construe the replevin statute to require a predeprivation 
hearing even though the plaintiff had obtained a predispute security agreement); Gazil, Inc. v. Super 
Food Servs., Inc., 356 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1978). 
Of course, due process can be violated even in the context of a plaintiff-creditor who has obtained a 
predispute contract and lien if the replevin statute lacks the procedural safeguards Mitchell requires.  
See, e.g., Wyatt v. Cole, 710 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Miss. 1989); Thornton v. Carson, 533 P.2d 657 (Ariz. 
1975).  In other words, lien-granting contracts are waivers of some, but not all, due process rights. 
 124. The purchase-money security interest in consumers' automobiles is routine and has been for 
generations.  In 1965, the primary drafter of Article 9 noted "that most automobile purchases are 
financed under some kind of security device," 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 550 (1965), and today a leading casebook on secured transactions says that "it 
seems probable that the number of security interests granted against automobiles in the United States 
each year exceeds the total number of security interests granted in all other types of personal property 
combined."  LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 
419 (4th ed. 2003). 
 125. Section 9-203 of the UCC states the requirements for the formation of an enforceable security 
agreement.  See UCC § 9-203 (amended 2001).  The only way in which this provision departs from gen-
eral contract formation requirements is the requirement of a signed writing.  This, of course, is "an evi-
dentiary requirement in the nature of a Statute of Frauds."  Id. cmt. 3.  And there are many sorts of 
contracts within a Statute of Frauds, FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, § 6.2, including arbitration agree-
ments, for which the FAA requires a writing.  See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
 126. See, e.g., Sonnier v. Boudreaux, 673 So. 2d 713, 717 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting a debtor's 
argument that "she did not realize she was signing a security agreement" on the grounds that 
"[a]lthough the law does not compel people to read or to inform themselves of the contents of -
instruments . . . they may choose to sign, except in certain exceptional cases, it holds them to the conse-
quences, in the same manner and to the same extent as though they had exercised those rights"); see 
also Michael M. Greenfield, The Role of Assent in Article 2 and Article 9, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 289, 296 
(1997) ("Article 9 poses no limitations on the types of goods in which a creditor may take a security 
interest and pays no special attention to the process by which a consumer apparently assents to the 
creation of a security interest in his or her assets."); Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform 
Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 612 (1998) 
("[S]ecured consumer credit transactions are largely the result of contracts of adhesion.  An automobile 
purchaser rarely negotiates the terms under which her car may be repossessed when she takes out a 
loan secured by the car.  Even more problematic, many store credit cards create purchase money secu-
rity interests with language on the back of the charge slip.  In these instances, the consumer may not 
even be aware that a security interest has been created and perfected."). 
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apply to arbitration agreements the civil waiver standard it has begun to 
develop in such cases as Fuentes and Overmyer."127  That this urging is based on 
a dated reading of constitutional law is demonstrated by Professor Shell's wide-
ranging study of contract cases in the Supreme Court.  Shell discusses three 
periods in the Court's treatment of contracts: "(1) the Lochner-era period from 
1870 to 1937; (2) the New Deal/Warren Court from 1937 to 1971; and (3) the 
modern Court from 1971 to the present."128  Although "[s]cholars generally con-
sider the Lochner era to be the high water mark for freedom of contract in 
Supreme Court history,"129 Shell concludes "that the modern Court is, in impor-
tant respects, more market-oriented than the Lochner Court."130  Interestingly, 
the cases Sternlight urges the Court to apply in the arbitration context, Fuentes 
and Overmyer, were decided at the transition point between the New 
Deal/Warren era and the modern era.  Shell states that 
[a]lthough Fuentes was decided in 1972, one year after the cutoff point for the Warren 
Court era used in this Article, a four-Justice Warren Court coalition consisting of Jus-
tices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall issued the plurality opinion for the 
seven-member Court.  Justices Powell and Rehnquist took no part in the decision, and 
Justices White, Blackmun, and Burger dissented.  Fuentes therefore represents the last 
effort of the Warren Court Justices to stamp their views on contract into the Constitu-
tion.131 
In Mitchell, by contrast, "a voting majority consisting of Justices White, Powell, 
Burger, Blackmun, and Rehnquist sharply curtailed Fuentes v. Shevin."132  Jus-
tices Stewart, Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan dissented.133  As Professor Shell's 
study indicates, the Mitchell majority, rather than the Fuentes plurality, better 
represents the modern Court and, presumably, current standards of consent for 
the waiver of constitutional rights.  For this reason, among others, courts should 
resist Professor Sternlight's urging that they apply pre-Mitchell standards to 
arbitration agreements.134 
C. Forum-Selection Clauses 
Property-deprivation cases such as Mitchell are not the only ones in which 
constitutional rights are waived by form contract.  Such waivers also occur 
 
 127. Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 40, at 57. 
 128. Shell, supra note 97, at 447. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 437. 
 131. Id. at 474 n.244. 
 132. Id. at 477-78. 
 133. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 629-36 (1974). 
 134. Professor Sternlight is not alone in wanting the Supreme Court to depart from its practice of 
applying contract-law standards of consent to constitutional rights.  See Brunet, supra 40, at 108 
(expressing dissatisfaction that "the present threshold for waiving civil constitutional rights seems to be 
that the waiving party only have satisfied contract law principles"); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice 
of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 291, 365 (1988) (decrying the application of contract principles to determine whether a forum-
selection clause is an enforceable waiver because of the "ominous" implications for the surrender of 
constitutional rights); Rubin, supra note 68, at 545  (criticizing the use of contract law in determining 
whether a waiver of due process rights has occurred). 
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through forum-selection clauses, contract clauses specifying the jurisdiction in 
which parties will litigate any disputes arising out of the contract.  The land-
mark case is Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,135 in which the Supreme Court 
enforced a forum-selection clause in a form contract requiring the consumer-
plaintiffs, who were from Washington State, to sue in Florida.136  In enforcing 
this nonnegotiated clause contained in three pages of fine print, the Carnival 
Cruise Court applied contract-law standards of consent, rather than a knowing-
consent standard.137  Furthermore, the Court endorsed a law-and-economics 
rationale for doing so, citing an opinion by Judge Richard Posner for the -
proposition that  "it stands to reason that passengers who purchase tickets 
containing a forum clause like that at issue in this case benefit in the form of 
reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the 
fora in which it may be sued."138 
While Professor Sternlight concedes that Carnival Cruise "provides insight 
into how the Court would assess the constitutionality of an arbitration clause 
imposed by a company on weaker parties, such as consumers,"139 she distin-
guishes the case on the ground that it "did not involve waiver of an accepted 
constitutional right, in that the Court has never found that plaintiffs have a con-
stitutional right to sue in a convenient jurisdiction."140  This seems to be an open 
question.  In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,141 the Supreme Court said: 
Because States place fewer burdens upon absent class plaintiffs than they do upon 
absent defendants in nonclass suits, the Due Process Clause need not and does not 
afford the former as much protection from state court jurisdiction as it does the latter.  
The Fourteenth Amendment does protect "persons," not "defendants," however, so 
absent plaintiffs as well as absent defendants are entitled to some protection from the 
jurisdiction of a forum State which seeks to adjudicate their claims.142 
 
 135. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).  Carnival Cruise has since been overruled by Congress in the context of 
passenger tickets.  46 U.S.C. app. § 183c(a)(2) (2000).  However, this ought not affect the discussion 
here because Carnival Cruise is referenced here only for its bearing on how the Supreme Court might 
react to arbitration clauses in light of its reaction to forum-selection clauses. 
 136.The clause provided: 
It is agreed by and between the passenger and the Carrier that all disputes and matters what-
soever arising under, in connection with or incident to this Contract shall be litigated, if at all, 
in and before a Court located in the State of Florida, U.S.A., to the exclusion of the Courts of 
any other state or country. 
499 U.S. at 587-88. 
 137. The Court did not "address the question whether respondents had sufficient notice of the 
forum clause before entering the contract for passage" because it found the plaintiffs "essentially have 
conceded that they had notice of the forum selection provision."  Id. at 590 (citing Brief for Respon-
dents 26 ("The respondents do not contest the incorporation of the provisions nor [sic ] that the forum 
selection clause was reasonably communicated to the respondents, as much as three pages of fine print 
can be communicated."). 
 138. Id. at 594 (citing Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 1990)).  
Professor Sternlight points out that "[m]any commentators have sharply attacked the Court for its 
blithe conclusion that the Carnival Cruise forum selection clause would benefit passengers as well as 
the cruise line."  Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 40, at 55. 
 139. Id. at 54. 
 140. Id. 
 141. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
 142. Id. at 811. 
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While Professor Sternlight correctly notes that Shutts involved class actions in 
particular and did not announce a general "constitutional right to sue in a con-
venient jurisdiction,"143 Shutts can be fairly read to say that plaintiffs have some 
due process "protection from the jurisdiction of a forum State which seeks to 
adjudicate their claims."144  Thus, it is at least plausible that a forum-selection 
clause like that in Carnival Cruise waives consumer-plaintiffs' due process 
rights. 
Even if the rights waived by forum-selection clauses do not include due pro-
cess rights, they sometimes include the Seventh Amendment jury-trial right.  
Carnival Cruise apparently did not involve such a waiver because, first, the Sev-
enth Amendment applies in both the contractually selected forum and the 
forum that otherwise would have heard the case, and, second, Carnival Cruise is 
an admiralty case, and there is no Seventh Amendment jury-trial right in admi-
ralty cases.145  Other forum-selection cases, however, do involve waiver of the 
Seventh Amendment jury-trial right.146  These are cases in which that right is 
present in the forum that would have heard the case but not in the forum 
selected in the contract.  The most common examples are cases in which the 
selected forum is outside the United States.  In several such cases, federal courts 
have enforced a clause selecting a non-U.S. forum in which there is no jury-trial 
 
 143. Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 40, at 54. 
 144. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography As a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-Selection 
Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423, 465 (1992) ("In cases like Carnival Cruise 
consumer-plaintiffs should receive the full protection that the Due Process Clause guarantees for a 
simple but compelling reason: the function of forum selection clauses in consumer form contracts is 
precisely to reverse the standard position of the parties with respect to forum selection."). 
 145. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 459-60 (1851) (upholding the 
constitutionality of a statute providing for the right to jury trial in admiralty proceedings); Waring v. 
Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 460 (1847) (holding that the Seventh Amendment does not require jury 
trials in admiralty cases). 
However, if the plaintiff can show an additional ground for federal jurisdiction, then the plaintiff 
does have a Seventh Amendment jury-trial right, at least if the plaintiff forgoes admiralty jurisdiction 
and procedures in favor of the "law" side of the court under the other ground for federal jurisdiction.
 
 
See, e.g., Ghotra by Ghotra v. Bandila Shipping, Inc., 113 F.3d 1050, 1057 (9th Cir. 1997); Linton v. 
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964 F.2d 1480, 1489 (5th Cir. 1992); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET. 
AL, 14A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3672 (3d ed. 1998) ("A claim brought on the 'law' 
side of the federal courts can be tried to a jury on demand of one of the parties, even though it is mari-
time in nature, in accordance with the constitutional command of the Seventh Amendment."); David 
W. Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, The Right to a Jury Trial in Jones Act Cases: Choosing the Forum 
Versus Choosing the Procedure, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 649, 654 (1999).  Accordingly, two diversity cases 
hold that passengers retain their jury-trial right in negligence actions against cruise lines.  See 
McDonough v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 1517(RWS), 2000 WL 341115, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
30, 2000); Sullivan v. Ajax Navigation Corp., 881 F. Supp. 906, 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).  These cases do not 
explicitly state whether the plaintiffs' jury-trial rights are constitutional or merely statutory. 
 146. It is, therefore, overbroad to say that forum-selection clauses do not waive a constitutional 
right.  See, e.g., Heller Fin., Inc. v. Finch-Bayless Equip. Co., No. 90 C 1672, 1990 WL 103232, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. July 17, 1990) ("Unlike the right to a jury trial, contractual forum selection impairs no consti-
tutional rights unless the forum selected denies a party due process.  The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore 
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).  For a contractual waiver of constitutional rights to be effective, it must be 
knowingly and voluntarily signed."); Hydramar, Inc. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., No. CIV. A. 85-1788, 
1989 WL 159267, at *2 n.5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 1989) (stating that a forum-selection clause "is clearly dis-
tinguishable from a Seventh Amendment demand for a jury trial matter and involves significantly less 
profound interest."). 
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right even though the claims appear to have been legal, rather than equitable, 
and thus, entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.147  In enforcing 
these clauses, these cases enforce the waiver of the Seventh Amendment jury-
trial right. 
These cases appear to use contract-law standards of consent, rather than a 
knowing-consent standard.148  Many cite and apply The Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co.,149 in which the Court held that the forum-selection clause at issue 
should have been enforced "unless Zapata could clearly show that enforcement 
would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such rea-
sons as fraud or overreaching."150  Though Bremen was an admiralty case in 
which Seventh Amendment was apparently not implicated, federal courts have 
applied this standard to forum-selection clauses that did waive the jury-trial 
right.  For example, in a breach of contract action, the Ninth Circuit said: 
The enforceability of forum selection clauses in international agreements is controlled 
by the Supreme Court's decision in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.  In Bremen, 
the Court first held that forum selection clauses are prima facie valid and should not 
 
 147. See Interamerican Trade Corp. v. Companhia Fabricadora De Pecas, 973 F.2d 487 (6th Cir. 
1992) (breach of contract claim; Brazilian courts selected); Paper Express, Ltd. v. Pfankuch Maschinen, 
972 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1992) (breach of warranty claim; German courts selected); Spradlin v. Lear 
Siegler Mgt. Servs. Co., Inc., 926 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1991) (claims for breach of contract, slander, emo-
tional distress, fraud, and age discrimination; Saudi Arabian courts selected); Taag Linhas Aereas de 
Angola v. Transamerica Airlines, Inc., 915 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1990) (breach of contract claim; Swiss 
courts selected); Appell v. George Philip & Son, Ltd., 760 F. Supp. 167 (D. Nev. 1991) (breach of con-
tract claim; English courts selected). 
Federal appellate courts are unanimous in enforcing forum-selection clauses with respect to securi-
ties fraud claims brought by U.S. investors or "Names" in Lloyd's of London.  See, e.g., Lipcon v. 
Underwriters of Lloyd's London, 148 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1998); Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 
F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).  These cases enforce clauses choosing the courts of England, even 
though English courts do not use juries for claims like securities fraud, which are legal, rather than 
equitable, and thus within the Seventh Amendment.  In most of the Lloyd's cases, however, the inves-
tors traveled to London to execute the contracts.  See, e.g., Lipcon, 148 F.3d at 1288.  Thus, consent was 
probably "knowing." 
 148. Even cases refusing to enforce international forum-selection clauses seem to use contract-law 
standards of consent, rather than knowing consent.  See, e.g., Sun Trust Bank v. Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 
184 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (S.D. Fla. 2001).  Sun Trust involved a forum-selection clause on a guest registra-
tion form at a Bahamian resort.  The court refused to enforce the clause on grounds that might best be 
called procedural unconscionability: 
It is further undisputed that the forum-selection clause was presented to her for the first time 
upon arrival in the Bahamas, after she had flown there with her two children.  Moreover, the 
manner in which the forum-selection clause is presented to the guest makes it objectively 
appear to be a required part of the registration process.  The guest is told to read and sign, not 
to read and then decide if they want to sign.  This may explain why defendants are not aware 
of anyone ever refusing to sign the clause; no reasonable person in Ms. Humphreys' [sic] posi-
tion would think they had such an option. 
Id. at 1261.  The Sun Trust court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the clause should be unenforce-
able because she did not give knowing consent: "Ms. Humphreys did not realize that she was signing a 
restrictive clause because she did not read it before signing, not because it was hidden from her."  Id. at 
1260; see also Doe v. Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1331 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (holding, when an 
eighteen-year-old plaintiff alleged that she was raped while on vacation at the defendant's resort, that 
her stepfather's signature on a guest registration form containing a forum-selection clause "was either 
insufficient to bind her or was voided . . . upon [her] reaching the age of majority"). 
 149. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 150. Id. at 15. 
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be set aside unless the party challenging enforcement of such a provision can show it is 
"'unreasonable' under the circumstances."  The Supreme Court has construed this 
exception narrowly.  A forum selection clause is unreasonable if (1) its incorporation 
into the contract was the result of fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining 
power; (2) the selected forum is so "gravely difficult and inconvenient" that the com-
plaining party will "for all practical purposes be deprived of its day in court,"; or (3) 
enforcement of the clause would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in 
which the suit is brought. To establish the unreasonableness of a forum selection 
clause, Appellants have the "heavy burden of showing that trial in the chosen forum 
would be so difficult and inconvenient that the party would effectively be denied a 
meaningful day in court." 
Although Bremen is an admiralty case, its standard has been widely applied to forum 
selection clauses in general.151 
Nowhere in this statement of law is there a requirement of knowing consent.  In 
fact, this sounds very much like a statement of ordinary contract law—including 
the doctrines of misrepresentation, undue influence, unconscionability, and ille-
gality—as applied to forum-selection clauses. 
Likewise, in Leonard v. Garantia Banking Ltd.,152 the Second Circuit 
affirmed a decision citing Bremen in rejecting knowing-consent standards in 
favor of contract-law standards of consent.  Importantly, the court in Leonard 
enforced a Bahamian forum-selection clause despite the agreement's having 
been written in English and the plaintiff-investor's lack of fluency in English.  
The Leonard court reasoned, "There is no indication that [the defendant] did 
anything to prevent [the plaintiff] from having the Agreement translated before 
signing it."153 
In Spradlin v. Lear Siegler Management Services Co.,154 the Ninth Circuit 
enforced a forum-selection clause waiving the jury-trial right even though the 
clause was in an employment agreement and even though the chosen forum was 
Saudi Arabia, a nation whose laws hardly resemble those of the United States.155  
The Spradlin court cited Bremen and said: 
There is nothing in the case law . . . to suggest that a different analysis applies to forum 
selection clauses in employment contracts than generally applies to commercial con-
tracts. 
On the contrary, while there are few published opinions addressing the issue in the 
employment context, those opinions all apply the framework set out in Bremen and its 
progeny.156 
 
 151. Argueta v. Banco Mexicano, S.A., 87 F.3d 320, 324-25 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 
 152. No. CIV.A.85-1788, 1999 WL 944802, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1999), aff'd, 213 F.3d 626 (2d 
Cir. 2000). 
 153. Id. at *7-8. 
 154. 926 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 155. Id. at 866.  ("This Employment Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia.  The courts of Saudi Arabia shall have sole jurisdiction over any disputes arising out of 
this Employment Agreement.").  The case involved claims for breach of contract, slander, emotional 
distress, fraud, and age discrimination. 
 156. Id. at 867.  The Spradlin court cited cases enforcing forum-selection clauses in employment 
agreements selecting the courts of Saudi Arabia and West Germany as the forum, as well as an 
employment arbitration agreement selecting France.  See id. (citing Tisdale v. Shell Oil Co., 723 F. 
Supp. 653, 654-57 (M.D. Ala. 1987) (Saudi Arabia); Gaskin v. Stumm Handel GmbH, 390 F. Supp. 361, 
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In sum, courts are applying Bremen's standards of consent to a variety of forum-
selection clauses that waive the Seventh Amendment jury-trial right, and these 
standards are far closer to contract-law standards than knowing-consent 
standards.  While most of these cases involve businesses, a few involve -
individual employees and investors.  And federal courts have even used 
Bremen-Carnival Cruise standards to enforce international forum-selection 
clauses in the context of consumer cruise tickets.157  The plaintiffs in these cruise 
cases likely would have had a Seventh Amendment jury-trial right had the 
clauses not been enforced because the plaintiffs likely could have satisfied 
diversity, as well as admiralty, jurisdiction.158 
There is, then, in the law governing forum-selection clauses, ample prece-
dent to support the constitutionality of the FAA's contract-law standards of 
consent.  While arbitration agreements waive the Seventh Amendment jury-
trial right, so do many international forum-selection clauses.  And the cases on 
international forum-selection clauses, including Bremen, use consent standards 
far closer to those of contract law than to a knowing-consent standard. 
It must be conceded, however, that the courts enforcing international 
forum-selection clauses do not acknowledge that by holding such clauses 
enforceable they are holding that a party has waived a constitutional right.  Few 
international forum-selection clause cases even mention the absence of a jury in 
the contractually chosen forum, and none of those that do say, "Wait!  That's 
important!  That means a constitutional right is involved here, so we better 
think long and hard about the applicable standards of consent for waiver!"  
While Professor Sternlight points out that arbitration cases generally evince a 
"lack of attention" to the fact that arbitration clauses waive constitutional jury-
trial rights,159 international forum-selection cases seem to pay no attention to the 
issue at all. 
D. Consent-to-Jurisdiction Clauses 
Forum-selection clauses can be used to compel a defendant to litigate in the 
contractually chosen forum even though that forum would not have had juris-
diction over that defendant in the absence of the clause.  In this context, the 
 
366-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (West Germany); Pauly v. Biotronik, GmbH, 738 F. Supp. 1332, 1334-35 (D. 
Or. 1990) (France)). 
 157. Effron v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc., 67 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995); Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed 
Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1988), over'd on other grounds, 490 U.S. 495 (1989); Hollander v. 
K-Lines Hellenic Cruises, S.A., 670 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).  But see Schaff v. Sun Line Cruises, 
Inc., 999 F. Supp. 924 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (denying Sun Cruise Line's motion to dismiss because Schaff 
received the ticket containing the forum-selection clause after her purchase and would thus have to for-
feit the purchase price if she rejected the cruise contract).  In Effron, the Second Circuit relied on a 
Supreme Court arbitration decision in holding that "[t]he fact that Sun Line Greece's Passage contract 
designates a foreign court as the forum for adjudication does not change the inconvenience calculus" of 
Bremen.  67 F.3d at 10 (citing Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 
(1995)). 
 158. See supra note 145. 
 159. Sternlight, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 711-16. 
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clause, often called a "consent-to-jurisdiction" or "submission-to-jurisdiction" 
clause, indisputably waives constitutional rights.  The Supreme Court held in 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington160 that due process requires "that in order 
to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within 
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that 
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.'"161  But, as Professor Shell explains, in Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz,162 the Court "signaled its acceptance of standardized contracts as a 
means of waiving the due process rights embodied in the 'minimum contacts' 
limits of personal jurisdiction."163  The Burger King Court said: 
We have noted that, because the personal jurisdiction requirement is a waivable right, 
there are a "variety of legal arrangements" by which a litigant may give "express or 
implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court."  For example, particularly in 
the commercial context, parties frequently stipulate in advance to submit their contro-
versies for resolution within a particular jurisdiction.  Where such forum selection 
provisions have been obtained through "freely negotiated" agreements and are not 
"unreasonable and unjust," [citing Bremen], their enforcement does not offend due 
process.164 
While this language is largely dicta because Burger King did not involve a con-
sent-to-jurisdiction clause, it did signal an endorsement of such clauses.  Since 
Burger King, many courts have enforced consent-to-jurisdiction clauses that 
waive constitutional rights—that is, clauses that require a defendant to litigate 
in a forum that otherwise would not have had jurisdiction over that defendant.165  
 
 160. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 161. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 162. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 163. Shell, supra note 97, at 478 ("In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, the Court declared that a 
choice of law clause contained in the boilerplate language of a franchise agreement, combined with the 
proposed twenty-year business relationship contemplated by the agreement, was persuasive evidence 
that a party had consented to be sued in the forum whose law had been selected."). 
 164.Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473 n.14. (citations omitted); see Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 
375 U.S. 311, 320 (1964) (permitting New York jurisdiction over Michigan defendants who signed a 
form contract appointing a New York agent to receive service of process, over a dissent stating that 
"upholding service of process in this case raises serious questions as to whether these Michigan farmers 
have been denied due process of law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments"). 
 165. See, e.g., Rooney v. Biomet, Inc., No. 99-2160, 2000 WL 559224 (1st Cir. Apr. 13, 2000); Gate-
way, Inc. v. Vitech Am., Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 391, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("The terms of the contract 
plainly establish that Microtec [a Brazilian corporation] has waived any objection to the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction by this Court."); Hanson Eng'rs Inc. v. UNECO, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 2d 797, 800 (C.D. 
Ill. 1999); Res. Ventures, Inc. v. Res. Mgmt. Intl., Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 423, 431 (D. Del. 1999) (stating 
that personal jurisdiction "can be waived by a party's express or implied consent to jurisdiction [and 
that the] use of a forum selection clause is an example of an express consent to personal jurisdiction") 
(citations omitted); Danka Funding, L.L.C. v. Page, Scrantom, Sprouse, Tucker & Ford, P.C., 21 F. 
Supp. 2d 465, 469 (D.N.J. 1998); Mut. Fire, Marine, & Inland Ins. Co. v. Armour, No. CIV.A.86-3562, 
1987 WL 9658, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1987); Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc. v. Metz, 566 F. Supp. 
131, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Leasecomm Corp. v. Crockett, No. 9456, 1998 WL 15935, at *2 (Mass. App. 
Div. Jan. 13, 1998) ("In the absence of contacts constitutionally sufficient to subject Crockett to long 
arm jurisdiction, Leasecomm could maintain an action against her in this Commonwealth only if 
Crockett contractually consented to Massachusetts jurisdiction through a forum selection clause.  Mas-
sachusetts recognizes that such clauses are valid as the sole basis for jurisdiction over a nonresident and 
should be enforced unless it is demonstrably unfair or unreasonable to do so."); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. 
Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Worley, 690 N.Y.S.2d 57, 59 (App. Div. 1999) ("[B]y agreeing to the forum 
WARE - KELLY 2 - 2.DOC 10/14/2004  10:26 AM 
Winter/Spring 2004] WAIVERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 195 
These cases reason that "[c]onsent to suit in a particular forum is an 
independent ground for the exercise of personal jurisdiction, separate and dis-
tinct from any personal jurisdiction based on an analysis of minimum 
contacts."166 
These cases generally appear to use contract-law standards of consent rather 
than a knowing-consent standard.  Some explicitly reject knowing-consent stan-
dards.167  Some cases refusing to enforce consent-to-jurisdiction clauses even 
seem to use contract-law standards of consent.168  An example is Central Ohio 
Graphics, Inc. v. Alco Capital Resource, Inc.,169 which (like many consent-to-
jurisdiction cases) arose out of an equipment lease.  In Central Ohio, the Geor-
gia Court of Appeals recognized that "[g]enerally, contractual clauses providing 
 
selection clause in the indemnity agreement, defendant specifically consented to personal jurisdiction 
over her in the courts of New York and thereby waived any basis to dispute New York's jurisdiction."); 
Retail Investors, Inc. v. Henzlik Inv. Co., 439 S.E.2d 196, 198 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) ("One method of 
consenting to personal jurisdiction is the inclusion in a contract of a consent to jurisdiction provision.  
This type of provision does not violate the Due Process Clause and is valid and enforceable unless it is 
the product of fraud or unequal bargaining power or unless enforcement of the provision would be 
unfair or unreasonable."); Sec. Credit Leasing, Inc. v. Armaly, 529 S.E.2d 283 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000); see 
also Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Romano's Auto Serv., 495 A.2d 286, 288 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985) (holding 
that "parties may agree 'to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court'"); Minuteman Press Int'l, Inc. v. 
Hoffman, 826 S.W.2d 34, 37 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) ("The contacts of the Hoffmans with the forum state 
of New York in connection with subject matter of the litigation, supported by the forum selection 
clause in the licensing agreement, were sufficient to bring the Hoffmans within the jurisdiction of the 
New York court."); Chase Third Century Leasing Co. v. Williams, 782 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); 
Minuteman Press Int'l, Inc. v. Sparks, 782 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).  But see Churchill Corp. v. 
Third Century, Inc., 578 A.2d 532, 536 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) ("Enforcement of forum selection under 
these leases would offend notions of due process . . . and is therefore per se unreasonable."). 
 166. Hanson Eng'rs, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 800; see also Danka Funding, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 469 (finding 
jurisdiction after stating: "Because there is no question that defendant lacks the minimum contacts nec-
essary to confer personal jurisdiction on this Court as contemplated by [International Shoe] and its 
progeny, the issue of whether personal jurisdiction exists rests solely on the enforceability of the forum 
selection clause in question."). 
 167. See, e.g., Sec. Credit Leasing, 529 S.E.2d at 286 ("Armaly merely alleged . . . that he did not 
read the lease provisions.  He had an opportunity to read the lease agreement and discover its contents, 
and is charged with notice of the content of the contract he signed.").  But see Bell Atl. Tricon Leasing 
Corp. v. Johnnie's Garbage Serv., Inc., 439 S.E.2d 221, 224 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) ("[W]e find that 
defendant did not knowingly and intelligently consent to the jurisdiction of the New Jersey courts.  
Therefore, enforcement of this provision would be both unfair and unreasonable."). 
Some other courts that refuse to enforce consent-to-jurisdiction clauses do so on grounds found in state 
law rather than on the federal ground that the constitutional rights consent standard was not met.  For 
example, Florida is among the minority of states requiring that defendants who have signed forum-
selection clauses also be reachable by the state's long arm statute.  See, e.g., Johns v. Taramita, 132 F. 
Supp. 2d 1021, 1029 (S.D. Fla. 2001) ("[B]ecause there was no basis for jurisdiction under the state's 
long-arm statute, [this court] did not have personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who had 
agreed to a Florida forum selection clause."); see also Ex parte Kenco Signs & Awning Div., Inc., 732 
So. 2d 1019, 1024 (Ala. Ct. App. 1999) ("[A] forum selection clause, however, cannot operate as the 
sole basis for a Florida court to exercise in personam jurisdiction over CDC.") (applying Florida law 
and citing McRae v. J.D./M.D., Inc., 511 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1987)). 
 168. See, e.g., Cent. Ohio Graphics, Inc. v. Alco Capital Res., Inc., 472 S.E.2d 2 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) 
(refusing to enforce an equipment lease because it "provides no intimation of the forum contemplated" 
and "as written would permit [the lessor] to bring this action in any state in the country" despite recog-
nizing that "[g]enerally, contractual clauses providing advance consent to the jurisdiction of a court 
which would not otherwise have personal jurisdiction are valid and enforceable"). 
 169.472 S.E.2d 2 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). 
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advance consent to the jurisdiction of a court which would not otherwise have 
personal jurisdiction are valid and enforceable."170  Nevertheless, the court 
refused to enforce the clause in that case because it "provides no intimation of 
the forum contemplated" and "as written would permit [the lessor] to bring this 
action in any state in the country."171  The reasoning and holding of Central Ohio 
are consistent with the contract-law standards of consent courts apply to 
arbitration clauses in form contracts.  For example, courts have held uncon-
scionable clauses requiring arbitration far from the location of the nondrafting 
party.172 
In support of the proposition that cases enforcing consent-to-jurisdiction 
clauses are using contract-law standards of consent is that many of these cases 
cite the Supreme Court's opinion in Bremen and derive from it a standard such 
as this: 
[A] forum selection clause is presumptively valid and enforceable by the forum unless 
the objecting party establishes (1) that it is the result of fraud or overreaching, (2) that 
enforcement would violate a strong policy of the forum, or (3) that enforcement would 
in the particular circumstances of the case result in litigation in a jurisdiction so seri-
ously inconvenient as to be unreasonable.173 
 This statement implies no requirement of knowing consent.  In fact, this 
sounds very much like a statement of ordinary contract law as applied to 
consent-to-jurisdiction clauses.  Some cases enforcing consent-to-jurisdiction 
clauses even cite Carnival Cruise and its law-and-economics rationale for using 
contract-law standards of consent.174  In short, courts do not seem to hold 
consent-to-jurisdiction clauses to a higher standard of consent than other 
forum-selection clauses. 
 
 170. Id. at 3. 
 171. Id. at 4. 
 172. See, e.g., Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 566-67 (Cal. Ct. App.) 
("While arbitration per se may be within the reasonable expectation of most consumers, it is much 
more difficult to believe that arbitration in Minnesota would be within the reasonable expectation of 
California consumers."), appeal denied, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 4322 (Cal. Aug. 12, 1993); Philyaw v. Plati-
num Enters., Inc., No. CL00-236, 2001 WL 112107, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2001) (holding an arbitration 
clause unconscionable because "[c]ommon sense dictates that retail purchasers such as the Philyaws 
could not afford the time and expense to go to Los Angeles to arbitrate a claim arising from a used car 
sale in Virginia"). 
 173. Res. Ventures, Inc. v. Res. Mgmt. Int'l, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 423, 431-32 (D. Del. 1999).  Other 
consent-to-jurisdiction cases citing Bremen include Danka Funding, L.L.C. v. Page, Scrantom, Sprouse, 
Tucker & Ford, P.C., 21 F. Supp. 2d 465, 469-70 (D.N.J. 1998), and Inso Corp. v. Dekotec Handelsges, 
mbH, 999 F. Supp. 165, 166 (D. Mass. 1998 ) ("A party to a contract may waive its right to challenge 
personal jurisdiction by consenting to personal jurisdiction in a forum selection clause."). 
 174. See, e.g., Danka Funding, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 471 ("Despite defendant's arguments to the con-
trary, defendant can be presumed to have received appropriate consideration . . .  in the form of a lower 
price.") (citing Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shutes, 499 U.S. 585 (1991)) (quotations omitted); see also 
Intermountain Sys., Inc. v. Edsall Const. Co., Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1195, 1197-98 (D. Colo. 1983) 
("Whether Mr. Edsall discussed or specifically bargained about the venue provision is of little import.  
He is presumed to have received appropriate consideration, in the form of a lower price, for the venue 
selection clause."). 
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Although most of the cases enforcing consent-to-jurisdiction clauses involve 
businesses, a few involve individual employees.175  And, as noted above, it does 
not take a consumer case to raise an inconsistency between contract-law stan-
dards of consent and constitutional requirements.  If the Due Process Clause 
does require knowing consent, then this requirement has frequently gone unmet 
in consent-to-jurisdiction cases between businesses.  Again, business people, 
like consumers, routinely sign form contracts without reading them, so it is 
simply not true that the line between business and consumer parties is the line 
between knowing and unknowing consent.176 
Consent-to-jurisdiction cases seem to use contract-law standards of consent, 
but, like those considering forum-selection clauses, none acknowledges that by 
holding these contract clauses enforceable they are holding that a party has 
waived a constitutional right.  Yet scholars critical of these cases note that this is 
exactly what these cases have done.  Professor Linda Mullenix, for example, 
laments that these cases depart from the "longstanding American tradition that 
'waivers of constitutional rights . . . must be deliberately and understandingly 
made.'"177 
In sum, contract-law standards are generally used for the waiver of constitu-
tional rights in property-deprivation cases, forum-selection cases, and consent-
to-jurisdiction cases, as well as in arbitration cases.  Case law governing jury-
waiver clauses stands out because of its failure to apply contract-law standards 
of consent and its requirement that consent be "knowing."  Part VI provides a 
history of jury-waiver clauses showing that the adoption of this requirement is 
both relatively recent and vulnerable to criticism. 
 
 175. See BABN Techs. Corp. v. Bruno,  25 F. Supp. 2d 593, 596 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("[T]he mere fact 
that Bruno signed a form contract and did not negotiate the forum selection clause is not sufficient to 
render the clause unenforceable."); Phone Directories Co. v. Henderson, 8 P.3d 256, 261-62 (Utah 
2000) (holding in an employment case that "people can contractually agree to submit to the jurisdiction 
of a particular court, even if that court might not have independent personal jurisdiction over them" 
because "the traditional defenses allowing one to avoid an unfair or unreasonable contract, such as 
duress and fraud, are available to parties litigating the validity of a forum"). 
 176. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 177. Mullenix, supra note 134, at 369.  Mullenix contends, 
It is ironic that the law steadfastly protects a defendant from litigation in an unreason-
able forum when that defendant knows nothing at all about subject matter or personal 
jurisdiction, yet the law does not supply the same due process protection if the defendant 
signs a boilerplate agreement.  In the latter instance the law simply imputes knowledge. 
Id. at 367. 
It should be noted that Mullenix's criticism of the standards of consent applied to forum-selection 
clauses and consent-to-jurisdiction clauses is remarkably similar to Sternlight's criticism of arbitration 
law's standards of consent.  That commentators who favor the higher knowing-consent standards are 
dissatisfied, for the same reasons, with many different areas of law only supports the proposition that 
contract-law standards of consent are found throughout many areas of law governing waiver of consti-
tutional rights. 
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VI 
THE OUTLIER: CASE LAW GOVERNING JURY-WAIVER CLAUSES 
This Article's examination of the law governing arbitration agreements, 
property-deprivation cases, forum-selection clauses, and consent-to-jurisdiction 
clauses suggests that contract-law standards of consent are at least as common 
as knowing-consent standards in the law governing civil waivers of constitu-
tional rights.  Professor Sternlight argues, however, that a knowing-consent 
standard is constitutionally required for arbitration agreements and, as support, 
cites case law applying knowing-consent standards to jury-waiver clauses.178  
This may have it reversed.  If the law governing jury-waiver clauses is the only 
major body of law regularly applying knowing-consent standards to civil waiv-
ers of constitutional rights, then perhaps it is the area of law that should change.  
Rather than arbitration law conforming to jury-waiver cases, perhaps jury-
waiver cases should conform to arbitration law—and property-deprivation cases 
and forum-selection cases and consent-to-jurisdiction cases.  Perhaps courts 
should stop requiring "knowing" consent in jury-waiver cases.  This view is sup-
ported by many decades of case law in which courts applied contract-law stan-
dards of consent to jury-waiver clauses.  It was not until the 1970s that courts 
imported the knowing-consent standard from criminal law into the civil context 
of the jury-waiver clause.  These recent jury-waiver cases fell out of step with 
the other areas of law pertaining to civil waivers of constitutional rights. 
A. The Early History of the Case Law Governing Jury-Waiver Clauses 
The earliest reported case concerning a jury-waiver clause appears to have 
been decided in 1925.179  From 1925 through 1960, the vast majority of the cases 
involving jury-waiver clauses arose out of real property leases,180 and most were 
decided by New York courts.181  In 1950, one of these courts noted that a par-
ticular form lease with a jury-waiver clause "is in very general use, being the 
form adopted by the real estate board."182  New York was not alone, though; a 
1959 Ohio case involving a lease jury-waiver clause said such clauses "are 
common in Ohio."183 
In the 1925 case, Zeesell Realty Co. v. Cunningham, the New York Supreme 
Court, Appellate Term, refused to enforce a jury-waiver clause found in the 
 
 178. Sternlight, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., passim. 
 179. See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Validity and Effect of Contractual Waiver of Trial by Jury, 73 
A.L.R.2d 1332, 1336 (1960) (citing Zeesell Realty Co. v. Cunningham, 211 N.Y.S. 591 (App. Term. 
1925)).  Research revealed no earlier cases involving predispute contracts with jury-waiver clauses.  In 
1874, however, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that a jury-waiver clause would be unenforceable.  
See Ins. Co. v. Morse., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874) (refusing to enforce the parties' agreement not to 
remove the dispute to federal court). 
 180. Shipley, supra note 179. 
 181. Id. at 1334-35. 
 182. Caplan v. Goldman, 95 N.Y.S.2d 835, 837 (App. Term. 1950). 
 183. Union Commerce Bank v. Kimbro, 162 N.E.2d 926, 927 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1959). 
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eighteenth paragraph of a lease.184  This holding was reversed, however, by a 
higher court, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division.185  The Appel-
late Division reiterated its enforcement of jury-waiver clauses in a 1931 case 
also arising out of a lease, Waterside Holding Corp. v. Lask.186  Lask was then 
cited in 1934 and 1938 in two more New York cases enforcing jury-waiver 
clauses in leases.187  Lask was also cited by courts in Connecticut and Ohio 
enforcing lease jury-waiver clauses.188  The first federal case to rule on the 
enforceability of jury-waiver clauses (decided in 1941) likewise cited and fol-
lowed Lask.189  More than a dozen other New York cases from the 1930s, 40s, 
and 50s also enforced lease jury-waiver clauses.190  In addition, at least two cases 
involved jury-waiver clauses in contracts other than leases.191  One of these was a 
"consumer" case insofar as it arose out of the purchase of an automobile.192  
None of these cases suggested that anything other than contract-law standards 
of consent were being applied, and none suggested that enforceability depended 
on "knowing" consent or the like.  Cases from this era that did refuse to enforce 
jury-waiver clauses did so, not because of a failure to meet a knowing-consent 
 
 184. 211 N.Y.S. 591 (App. Term. 1925). 
 185. See Waterside Holding Corp. v. Lask, 253 N.Y.S. 183, 184 (App. Div. 1931) (citing Zeesell 
Realty Co. v. Cunningham, 213 N.Y.S. 942 (App. Div. 1926)). 
 186. 253 N.Y.S. at 184. 
 187. Bryant Park Bldg. v. Abbott, 84 N.Y.S.2d 549, 550 (Mun. Ct. 1948); Cerana Apartments Corps. 
v. Solomon, 270 N.Y.S. 638, 639 (App. Term. 1934). 
 188. Nowey v. Kravitz, 51 A.2d 495, 496 (Conn. 1947); Nowey v. Kravitz, 14 Conn. Supp. 389, 389 
(C.P. 1946); Union Commerce Bank v. Kimbro, 162 N.E.2d 926, 927 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1959). 
 189. Van Leyden v. 360 E. 55th St. Corp., 39 F. Supp. 879, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); cf. McCarthy v. 
Wynne, 126 F.2d 620, 623 (10th Cir. 1942) (enforcing a post-dispute jury-waiver agreement "in the 
nature of a private contract"). 
While Van Leyden relied upon a New York state precedent, one commentator argues that a subse-
quent Supreme Court ruling makes this no longer good practice. 
In another early diversity case, Van Leyden v. 360 East 55th Street Corp., the judge applied 
New York state law in upholding a jury waiver in a lease.  The court did not rely on any fed-
eral precedent, nor did it discuss any special requirements for the waiver to be voluntary, 
knowing, or in exchange for valid consideration.  The reasoning of this decision was 
impliedly overruled by Simler v. Conner, which held that the question of a right to a jury trial 
is governed by federal, not state law.  Although Van Leyden is a federal case, it is no longer 
authoritative for purposes of determining the proper federal standard for the enforcement of 
contractual jury waivers. 
Matties, supra note 10, at 445 (citation omitted).  Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963), however, did 
not involve a jury-waiver clause.  It did not even involve waiver of the jury-trial right.  Simler involved 
the question whether a particular claim was legal (so that the jury-trial right would attach) or equitable 
(so that the jury-trial right would not attach).  Id. at 221.  The Court held that, even in a diversity case, 
federal rather than state law governs that determination.  Id. at 222.  The Court's statement that "the 
right to a jury trial in the federal courts is to be determined as a matter of federal law in diversity as 
well as other actions," id. at 222, should be read in that context. 
 190. See Shipley, supra note 179, at 1342-43 (citing cases). 
 191. Freeman v. Island Discount Corp., 169 N.Y.S.2d 830 (App. Div. 1958); Bonnie-Lassie Sports-
wear, Inc. v. Century Factors, Inc., 127 N.Y.S.2d 740 (App. Div. 1954). 
 192. Freeman involved a jury-waiver clause in a "chattel mortgage," the pre-Uniform Commercial 
Code equivalent of a security agreement. 
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standard, but for reasons consistent with contract law and its standards of 
consent.193 
B. The Historical Connection Between Contract-Law Standards of Consent 
for Jury-Waiver and Arbitration Clauses 
Importantly, during this era, the case law on consent standards for jury-
waiver clauses was consistent with that on consent standards for arbitration 
clauses.  Arbitration cases also seem to have been centered in New York.194  
And New York was the leader in enacting a modern arbitration statute—that is, 
a statute requiring courts to enforce predispute arbitration agreements.195  In 
fact, the FAA (which was enacted in 1925) was based on the New York Arbitra-
tion Act of 1920.196  Section 2 of the New York Act provided: 
A provision in a written contract to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter 
arising between the parties to the contract, or a submission hereafter entered into of 
an existing controversy to arbitration pursuant to title eight of chapter seventeen of 
the code of civil procedure, shall be valid, enforcible and irrevocable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.197 
Except for the spelling and placement of the word "enforceable," the New York 
Act's language was copied in section 2 of the FAA: "[such provisions] shall be 
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract."198  Thus, the FAA's adoption of con-
tract law's standards of consent simply copied the New York Arbitration Act's 
adoption of contract law's standards of consent. 
Soon after its enactment, the New York Arbitration Act was challenged as 
inconsistent with the jury-trial right granted by the New York state constitu-
tion.199  In an opinion by Judge Benjamin Cardozo, New York's highest court 
rejected this challenge, holding that "[t]he [jury-trial] right is one that may be 
waived.  It was waived by the consent to arbitrate."200  Thus, Judge Cardozo and 
his colleagues apparently concluded that the New York Arbitration Act's con-
tract-law standards of consent are consistent with the standards for waiving the 
New York Constitution's right to jury trial.  Similarly, federal courts have con-
sistently determined that the identical contract-law standards found in section 2 
are consistent with the standards for waiving the federal constitutional right to 
jury trial.  As discussed earlier, no published judicial decision has ever held sec-
tion 2's contract-law standards inconsistent with the Seventh Amendment.201 
 
 193. For example, one case enforced the clause with respect to the landlord's action against the 
tenant who signed the lease, but not the landlord's action against the guarantor.  See Garsau Realty 
Corp. v. Kohler, 282 N.Y.S. 822, 823 (Civ. Ct. 1935). 
 194. MACNEIL, supra note 69, at 25. 
 195. Id. at 25-47. 
 196. Id. at 106. 
 197. 1920 N.Y. LAWS 275 § 2 (codified as New York Civil Practice Act § 1448). 
 198. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); see MACNEIL, supra note 69, at 106. 
 199. Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288 (N.Y. 1921). 
 200. Id. at 291 (citations omitted). 
 201. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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C. The Departure from Contract-Law Standards of Consent 
While arbitration cases continue to hold that contract-law standards of con-
sent are consistent with the Seventh Amendment, the case law on jury-waiver 
clauses has departed from this view.  Possible hints of this departure can be 
found in the case law from the 1940s through the 1960s,202 but it was not until the 
1970s that the departure from contract-law standards to knowing-consent 
standards really began. 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, New York courts continued routine 
enforcement of jury-waiver clauses,203 including those found in consumer form 
contracts.204  Additionally, courts outside New York were increasingly presented 
with, and chose to enforce, such clauses.205  The vast majority of cases from this 
era suggest no departure from contract-law standards of consent.  For example, 
 
 202. The first case that arguably might be considered inconsistent with contract law was Klipack v. 
Raymar Novelties, Inc., 75 N.Y.S.2d 418 (App. Div. 1947).  Klipack held that a lease jury-waiver clause 
did not cover tenants' statutory claims under rent control statutes enacted after the lease was formed.  
Id. at 419-20.  Klipack might be considered an example of the rule of contract construction that ambi-
guities are construed against the drafter.  See FARNSWORTH, supra 16, at 473-74 (stating that this rule is 
"especially common."); see also James Talcott, Inc. v. Le Bou Slax, 87 N.Y.S.2d 509, 511 (Sup. Ct. 1949) 
(stating that since a jury-waiver clause is "in derogation of rights[,] [it] is to be construed strictly against 
the drawer of the instrument"). 
The first published jury-waiver–clause opinion by a federal appeals court, Rodenbur v. Kaufmann, 
320 F.2d 679 (D.C. Cir. 1963), also seems to be an example of this same rule.  While the court acknowl-
edged the general enforceability of jury-waiver clauses, id. at 683, it decided that the clause at issue did 
not cover the tenant's personal injury claim. 
The clause, strictly construed as it must be, did not bar a jury trial as to rights which the tenant 
might have against the landlords unless issues with respect thereto arose out of or were in 
some way connected with the lease of her apartment.  Such is the plain meaning of the lan-
guage. 
Id. at 684 (following Levy v. N.Y. Majestic Corp., 161 N.Y.S.2d 943 (App. Div. 1957)); accord Nat'l 
Acceptance Co. v. Myca Prods., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 269, 270 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (describing "the present 
case" as "similar" to Rodenbur and holding that "[a]pplication of the basic principle that ambiguities in 
a contract are construed against the drafting party supports the above construction of the waiver [that it 
does not cover the dispute] because plaintiff drafted the loan and security agreement"). 
 203. See, e.g., Chem. Bank v. Summers, 413 N.Y.S.2d 148 (App. Div. 1979); A.J. Armstrong Co. v. 
Nechamkin, 388 N.Y.S.2d 618 (App. Div. 1976); Fay's Drug Co. v. P&C Property Coop., 380 N.Y.S.2d 
398 (App. Div. 1976); Massry Importing Co. v. Sec. Nat'l Bank, 373 N.Y.S.2d 6 (App. Div. 1975); 
Franklin Nat'l Bank of Long Island v. Capobianco, 266 N.Y.S.2d 961 (App. Div. 1966); Estate of 
Greenberg v. Schefler, 425 N.Y.S.2d 909 (App. Term. 1979) (reversing a lower court's holding of 
unconscionability and holding that a lease waiving the jury-trial right was valid and binding); Ave. 
Assocs., Inc. v. Buxbaum, 373 N.Y.S.2d 814 (App. Term. 1975); Eisenberg v. 230 Kent Corp., 229 
N.Y.S. 2d 109 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Riverbay Corp. v. Lattimore, 414 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Civ. Ct. 1979) (holding 
that a lease jury-waiver clause is "generally valid and binding unless a proceeding is brought within the 
purview of section 259-c of the Real Property Law[,] which renders null and void a jury lease waiver in 
an action for personal injuries or property damages"); Arol Dev. Corp. v. Goodie Brand Packing Corp., 
372 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Civ. Ct. 1975); Lerner v. Rivera, 206 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Mun. Ct. 1960). 
Some New York cases involved jury-waiver clauses that failed to satisfy a statutory requirement 
regarding font size.  See, e.g., Koslowski v. Palmieri, 414 N.Y.S.2d 599 (App. Term. 1979); Sorbonne 
Apartments Co. v. Kranz, 409 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Civ. Ct. 1978). 
 204. David v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 298 N.Y.S.2d 847 (App. Term. 1969). 
 205. See, e.g., Smith-Johnson Motor Corp. v. Hoffman Motors Corp., 411 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Va. 
1975); Central Inv. Assocs., Inc. v. Leasing Serv. Corp., 362 So. 2d 702 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); 
Azalea Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Sargoy, 214 S.E.2d 131 (Va. 1975). 
WARE - KELLY 2 - 2.DOC 10/14/2004  10:26 AM 
Winter/Spring 2004] WAIVERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 202 
in 1969 the New York Appellate Division reversed a lower court's attempt to 
create a knowing-consent standard.206 
The court below denied the motion to strike the jury demand upon the sole claim of 
the respondents that they had been unaware that each instrument contained a jury 
waiver provision.  In so doing the court erred.  "Ordinarily, the signer of a deed or 
other instrument, expressive of a jural act, is conclusively bound thereby.  That his 
mind never gave assent to the terms expressed is not material."  "Not to have read the 
contract or to have had it read to him before signing, if that be a fact as he testified, 
furnishes no basis for his repudiation of any of its terms."207 
The first reported decision to use a knowing-consent standard without being 
reversed seems to have been Colgate Construction Corp. v. Hill.208  This city-
court case involved a one-page form contract used by a home improvement con-
tractor.  The form had printing on both sides, with the place for the customer's 
signature on the front and the jury-waiver clause was on the back.209  The judge 
held that these facts "do not permit this court to find that defendants knowingly 
waived their rights to a jury trial."210  This case appears to be the only 
unreversed case to require knowing consent before that requirement was 
imposed in 1977 by the Second Circuit in National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. 
Hendrix.211 
Hendrix is the "leading" case for those who advocate a knowing-consent 
requirement.212  It has been described as "one of the first cases to articulate a 
modern standard for the enforcement of contractual jury waivers."213  Another 
way to put it is that the court in Hendrix had very little basis for its announce-
ment of this "modern" standard.  None of the cases cited in Hendrix even 
involved jury-waiver clauses.  The Hendrix court wrote: 
It is elementary that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury is fundamental and that 
its protection can only be relinquished knowingly and intentionally.  Johnson v. 
Zerbst, [304 U.S. 458] (1938); Heyman v. Kline, 456 F.2d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, [409 U.S. 847] (1972). Indeed, a presumption exists against its waiver. Aetna 
Insurance Co. v. Kennedy, [301 U.S. 389] (1937).  There is little doubt that the provi-
sion relied on by NER fails to overcome this presumption.  The waiver clause was set 
deeply and inconspicuously in the contract, and Justice Black, dissenting in National 
Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, [375 U.S. 311, 332-3] (1964), aptly characterized 
the nature of NER's form agreements: 
this printed form provision buried in a multitude of words is too weak an imita-
tion of a genuine agreement to be treated as a waiver of so important a constitu-
tional safeguard . . . it exhausts credulity to think that they or any other layman 
reading these legalistic words would have known or even suspected that they 
amounted to (such) an agreement . . . . 
A footnote followed: 
 
 206. James Talcott, Inc. v. Wilson Hosiery Co., 299 N.Y.S.2d 460 (App. Div. 1969). 
 207. Id., at 461 (citations omitted). 
 208. 334 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (Civ. Ct. 1972). 
 209. Id., at 1003. 
 210. Id., at 1004. 
 211. 565 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 212. Sternlight, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 678. 
 213. Matties, supra note 10, at 446. 
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In Szukhent, the Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, upheld a provision in a similar contract 
providing that service of process could be made on an agent designated in the docu-
ment.  The right to a jury trial, however, is far more fundamental than the right to per-
sonal service, and cannot be waived absent a showing that its relinquishment is know-
ing and intentional.  Fuentes v. Shevin, [407 U.S. 67] (1972) provides a compelling 
analogy. There, the Court refused to uphold a contractual provision waiving due proc-
ess rights, noting that there was "no showing whatever that the appellants were actu-
ally aware or made aware of the significance of the fine print now relied upon as a 
waiver of constitutional rights." [Id. at 95]. No such showing has been made here.214 
There is much here to criticize. 
First, for the proposition that the jury-trial right "can only be relinquished 
knowingly and intentionally," the court cited a criminal case, Johnson, a case 
that involved an attorney's oral waiver during a pretrial conference, Heyman, 
and a case that involved a directed verdict, Aetna.215  As noted above, courts 
(including the Supreme Court) apply higher consent standards for constitu-
tional waivers in the criminal context than in the civil context, and there are 
good reasons for doing so.216  Some of those reasons also make an oral waiver 
during litigation an inapt analogue to a jury-waiver clause found in a contract. 
Second, the Hendrix court's treatment of Szukhent is flawed.  The court 
provided no support for its assertion that the jury-trial right "is far more fun-
damental than the right to personal service" waived in Szukhent.217  "Waiver of 
service of process is equivalent to waiver of personal jurisdiction, which is a due 
process right."218  Hendrix provides no authority or reasoning to explain why the 
standard for civil waivers of constitutional rights should differ when the right is 
found in the Seventh Amendment as opposed to the Due Process Clause. 
Finally, the Hendrix court cited Fuentes without citing Mitchell or Bremen.  
As noted above, Fuentes "represents the last effort of the Warren Court Justices 
to stamp their views on contract into the Constitution," while Mitchell and 
Bremen are better indicators of modern constitutional law.219 
Hendrix was already out of step with the Supreme Court when it was 
decided in 1977, and it is now farther out of step with a modern Supreme Court 
that has applied contract-law standards of consent in forum-selection cases such 
as Carnival Cruise and in arbitration cases such as Casarotto.220  Thus, the case 
for overruling the Hendrix court's knowing-consent requirement is strong.  And 
although most federal courts since Hendrix have applied its knowing-consent 
 
 214. Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258 & n.1. 
 215. "The Hendrix court did not acknowledge that it was applying cases involving jury waivers that 
occurred during litigation to a situation in which the waiver was executed before any controversy 
between the parties arose."  Matties, supra note 10, at 446. 
 216. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 217. Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258. 
 218. Matties, supra note 10, at 447 (critiquing Hendrix); see WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 123, 
§ 1074 ("The decisions of the Supreme Court make it clear that the requirement of reasonable notice 
must be regarded as part of the constitutional due process limitations on the jurisdiction of a state or 
federal court."). 
 219. See supra Part V.B. (quoting Shell, supra note 97). 
 220. For other Supreme Court cases, see supra note 60. 
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requirement,221 few of these are appellate courts.222  Furthermore, many state 
courts continue to use contract-law rather than knowing-consent standards even 
in "consumer" contexts such as residential leases and safe deposit boxes.223  
Most importantly, the Supreme Court has yet to address the proper consent 
standards for waiver of Seventh Amendment rights.  If and when the Supreme 
Court does reach the issue, it can overrule the Hendrix court's knowing-consent 
 
 221. See Sternlight, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 678-79.  An exception is Smyly v. 
Hyundai Motor America, 762 F. Supp. 428 (D. Mass. 1991) (enforcing a jury-waiver clause despite a 
lack of knowing consent).  In some cases, it is not entirely clear whether the court is applying knowing-
consent standards or contract-law standards.  Professor Sternlight characterizes Telum, Inc. v. E.F. 
Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1988), as "citing, favorably, [a] standard that permits 
[the] waiver of [a] fundamental jury trial right that is knowing and intentional, while going on to uphold 
[the] waiver in [a] commercial loan."  Sternlight, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 678 n.43.  
However, Telum may not belong in the pro-Hendrix camp because it seems to rely, not "on facts such 
as inconspicuous fine print or a gross disparity in bargaining power," but rather "allegations of fraud in 
the inducement relating to the contract as a whole."  Telum, 859 F.2d at 837; see Bonfield v. AAMCO 
Transmissions, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 589, 596 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (stating that the franchisee "knowingly and 
intelligently waived his right to a jury trial" without expressly stating that only knowing and intelligent 
waivers are enforceable).  Cases like Bonfield are perhaps analogous to the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Overmyer, which found that the knowing-consent standard was satisfied and thus that the Court did not 
need to decide whether that, or a more lenient standard, was controlling. 
 222. See Leasing Serv. Corp v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that the jury-trial 
right "is one that can be knowingly and intentionally waived by contract"); K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving 
Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 756 (6th Cir. 1985). 
One of these cases, K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., deserves comment.  First, K.M.C. is "[t]he 
perhaps most debated lender liability case."  A. Brooke Overby, Bondage, Domination, and the Art of 
the Deal: An Assessment of Judicial Strategies in Lender Liability Good Faith Litigation, 61 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 963, 997 (1993).  As Professor Overby puts it, K.M.C. was "the vanguard of pro-borrower 
forces," which created an "outcry" and a "backlash against it."  Id. at 969, 970, 1002.  Professor Overby 
cites a long list of cases questioning K.M.C.  Id. at nn.29, 230. 
With respect to the jury-waiver clause, the K.M.C. Court emphasized the debtor's contention that 
"it was represented to [debtor]'s president Butler before the signing of the financing agreement that the 
jury-waiver provision would not be enforced under circumstances such as those in the instant case," so 
"[t]his case is not like [cases] in which the party seeking to escape the waiver provision claimed that it 
did not intend or understand that in signing the contract there at issue it was waiving jury trial."  757 
F.2d at 757.  Finally, K.M.C. incorrectly states that "[t]hose cases in which the validity of a contractual 
waiver of jury trial has been in issue have overwhelmingly applied the knowing and voluntary stan-
dard."  Id. at 756.  While that may be true of post-Hendrix cases, it is not true (as Parts VI.A.-B. of this 
Article show) of the whole class of jury-waiver cases dating back to the 1920s. 
 223. See, e.g., L&R Realty v. Conn. Nat'l Bank, 715 A.2d 748, 753 (Conn. 1998); Gelco Corp. v. 
Campanile Motor Serv., Inc., 677 So. 2d 952 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Vista Centre Venture v. Unlike 
Anything, Inc., 603 So. 2d 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Palomares v. Ocean Bank of Miami, 574 So. 
2d 1159, 1160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Westland Mach. Co., Inc., 439 So. 2d 
332, 333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) ("Although the record demonstrates that he never read the contract, 
Westland's president cannot now be heard to complain of its terms.  He is bound by the contract which 
he signed."); Chase Commercial Corp. v. Owen, 588 N.E.2d 705, 709 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) ("[F]ederal 
cases . . . seem to impose a somewhat stricter standard . . . .  They require that any waiver be knowing 
and intentional."); Uribe v. Merchs. Bank of N.Y., 642 N.Y.S.2d 23 (App. Div. 1996) (discussing safe 
deposit box rental); Barclays Bank of N.Y., N.A. v. Heady Elec. Co., Inc., 571 N.Y.S.2d 650, 653 (App. 
Div. 1991) ("[E]ven if Heady had neglected to read the documents containing the waiver provisions, 
this alone would not affect their validity."); Drelich v. Kenlyn Homes, Inc., 446 N.Y.S.2d 409 (App. 
Div. 1982); Estate of Greenberg v. Schefler, 425 N.Y.S.2d 909 (App. Term 1979); Jossel v. Filicori, 547 
N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (discussing a residential lease); King Enters., Ltd. v. O'Connell, 660 
N.Y.S.2d 283 (Civ. Ct. 1997) (discussing a residential lease); Truck World, Inc. v. Fifth Third Bank, 
Nos. C-940029, C-940399, 1995 WL 577521 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 29, 1995); TS1 P'ship v. Allred, 877 
P.2d 156, 160-61 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
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requirement and thus harmonize the law on jury-waiver clauses with that of 
other civil waivers of constitutional rights. 
VII 
CONSLUSION: HARMONIZING THE LAW ON 
 CIVIL WAIVERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
There is an appeal to harmonizing the law on civil waivers of constitutional 
rights.224  Harmonization could occur in two ways—either by making jury-waiver 
cases conform to arbitration law, property-deprivation cases, forum-selection 
cases, and consent-to-jurisdiction cases, or by making these latter cases all 
conform to jury-waiver cases.  It seems more likely that the Supreme Court will 
choose the first approach, which would require overruling none of its own cases 
and only a few federal appeals court cases.225  In contrast, the second approach 
would require (1) overruling the holdings of many of the forum-selection and 
consent-to-jurisdiction cases decided since Bremen and Carnival Cruise;226 (2) 
casting doubt on property-deprivation cases since Mitchell and Doehr and 
perhaps on the basic law of secured transactions;227 and (3) holding 
unconstitutional a seventy-nine-year-old federal statute, FAA section 2.228  In 
other words, the second approach to harmonizing the law on civil waivers of 
constitutional rights would require upsetting the law in a variety of doctrinal 
areas.  It is therefore unlikely the Court will hold that the Seventh Amendment 
requires a knowing-consent standard for arbitration agreements.  It is more 
likely, and more desirable,229 that the Court will overrule the Hendrix court's 
knowing-consent requirement for jury-waiver clauses and thus harmonize the 
law on civil waivers of constitutional rights. 
 
 224. While harmonization is appealing, it is also possible that different types of Seventh Amend-
ment waivers should continue to be governed by different standards of consent.  See supra note 10. 
 225. See supra Part VI.C. 
 226. See supra Parts V.C-D. 
 227. See supra Part V.B. 
 228. See supra Part IV.  Relatedly, it would require confining Casarotto to state-court cases (in 
which the Seventh Amendment does not apply) and overruling federal cases that applied Casarotto to 
preempt state laws requiring standards of consent higher than those of contract law.  See, e.g., Morrison 
v. Colo. Permanente Med. Group, P.C., 983 F. Supp. 937, 943 (D. Colo. 1997) (holding that the Colo-
rado Health Care Availability Act's "medical services arbitration provisions are 'inconsonant' with, and 
therefore preempted by, the Federal Arbitration Act").  This would produce the bizarre result of such 
state laws applying in federal court but not in state court because in state court the FAA would, uncon-
strained by the Seventh Amendment, continue to preempt such laws. 
 229. For a normative argument that arbitration agreements should be governed by contract-law 
standards of consent rather than knowing consent, see Ware, supra note 66, at 218-21. 
